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ANTITRUST BALANCING IN A (NEAR) 
COASEAN WORLD: THE CASE OF FRANCIDSE 
TYING CONTRACTS 
Alan J. Meese* 
Antitrust law has largely succumbed to the hegemony of balancing. 
Courts applying the rule of :~;eason are told to balance a restraint's 
procompetitive effects against its anticompetitive impact.1 Mergers once 
deemed anticompetitive solely because they facilitated the exercise of 
market power are now evaluated by weighing the anticompetitive ef-
fects of such increased power against any efficiencies created by the 
transaction.2 Finally, some activities once deemed per se illegal are now 
subject to a balancing approach, either by explicit application of the 
rule of reason,3 or by recognition of certain affirmative defenses to oth-
* Assistant Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. A.B. 1986, The 
College of William and Mary in VIrginia; J.D. 1989, The University of Chicago.- Ed. 
Thomas Arthur, Ash Bhagwat, Curtis Bradley, Richard Craswell, Neal Devins, Jay 
Hamilton, Trotter Hardy, Charles Koch, Jr., Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Lande, Eu-
gene Scalia, and Elmer Schaefer provided helpful comments. Gretchen Asher and Sarah 
Crotty provided word processing assistance. 
1. Courts apply the rule of reason to restraints not deemed per se illegal. For the 
classic statement of the rule, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
238-39 (1918) (holding that a court must consider all relevant factors in determining 
whether contract merely "regulates" or instead "destroys" competition); see also Con-
tinental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977); Capital Imaging 
Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
510 u.s. 947 (1993). 
2. Compare United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) 
and U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (1968) with FTC V. Univer-
sity Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1991) and American Medical Inti., 
Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 218-19 (1984) and HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1992) 
[hereinafter HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, 
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18 
(1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs]. Indeed at one time, the presence of 
significant efficiencies apparently militated against a merger. See Timothy J. Muris, The 
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381, 
402-07 (1980). 
3. Compare Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (group boycott analyzed under rule of reason) and Continen-
tal T. V., 433 U.S. at 49 (exclusive territory analyzed under rule of reason) and Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (horizontal 
ancillary restraint analyzed under rule of reason) and Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City En-
ters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 
111 
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erwise per se violations. 4 
Unlike many other balancing tests, the balancing framework famil-
iar to antitrust scholars and practitioners is at least theoretically objec-
tive, if sometimes difficult to apply in practice.5 Drawing on neoclassi-
cal microeconomic analysis, this approach seeks to identify those 
instances in which anticompetitive effects - higher prices and distor-
tions in the allocation of resources - caused by a restraint outweigh 
their procompetitive benefits, usually efficiencies in producing a prod-
uct or service.6 While there is some dispute as to exactly which effects 
should count against a restraint - whether, for instance, transfers of 
wealth from consumers to producers should be deemed an anticompeti-
tive effect7 - the theoretical economic framework within which these 
effects are quantified and compared is invariate, and comprise what one 
scholar calls a "basic partial equilibrium welfare economics model. " 8 
The law of tying has been a moderately fertile source of such bal-
ancing litigation, particularly in the per se context, where judges and 
scholars have identified several possible procompetitive justifications 
596 (1972) (horizontal ancillary restraint per se illegal) and United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (exclusive territories per se unlawful), overruled 
by Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 36 and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 
U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott per se illegal). 
4. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 
1987) (entertaining and sustaining an affirmative defense); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. 
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (entertaining, but re-
jecting, an affirmative defense); cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Anti-
trust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988) (arguing that no 
contract is per se illegal, but that per se rules instead preclude the assertion of certain 
justifications for otherwise illegal conduct). 
5. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. CoLO. L. 
REv. 773, 779-82 (1990) (decrying the proliferation of multi-factor balancing tests); 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989) 
(same). 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66. 
7. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 110-13 (1993) (argu-
ing that antitrust law should only be concerned with allocational, as opposed to distribu-
tional, effects of a restraint) with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and 
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS 
L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that the primary objective of antitrust law is distributive in 
nature). 
8. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 
369 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; Williamson, Wel· 
fare Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 20; see also BoRK, supra note 7, at 107; Thomas C. Ar· 
thur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market 
Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15 (1994) (applying "Oliver Williamson's famous tradeoff 
model" in the tying context); Lande, supra note 7, at 143 (employing identical models 
to illustrate approaches premised upon differing definitions of consumer welfare). 
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for otherwise per se illegal arrangements.9 This article focuses on one 
such defense, the "franchise goodwill" justification. As courts and 
others have recognized, a franchise tying contract - that is, a franchise 
contract that requires a franchisee to purchase inputs from a franchisor 
as a condition of receiving a franchise - can reduce the agency costs 
that result from the division of labor that characterizes the relationship 
between franchisor and franchisee. More precisely, such a requirement 
can prevent a certain class of opportunistic behavior by franchisees, 
namely, the failure to provide a product of a quality sufficient to mairi-
tain the reputational value of the franchise trademark, while free riding 
on the quality control efforts of others.10 Thus, for example, a require-
ment by a fast food franchisor that its franchisees purchase its food in-
gredients or paper products might be justified as an attempt to ensure 
that franchisees do not "skimp" on quality and dilute the reputation of 
the franchise trademark.11 
Under current law, once a plaintiff establishes the elements of a 
per se tying violation, the procompetitive benefits of a reduction in op-
portunistic behavior must be weighed against the anticompetitive effects 
of the tie, which presumably has been "forced" on the purchaser by the 
exercise of market power.12 This weighing usually is not explicit, but in-
stead takes the form of a less restrictive alternative analysis under 
which the justification will fail when a less restrictive means of achiev-
ing the objective is available, even when the benefits of the tie out-
weigh any anticompetitive effects.13 
This article challenges the conventional analysis as applied to 
franchise tying contracts and questions its application in areas outside 
the franchise context as well. While consistent with the partial equilib-
rium welfare analysis employed in antitrust law generally, this conven-
9. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 
(1969) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing various procompetitive justifications); RicH-
ARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, .ANTrrn.UST 809-10 (2d ed. 1981) (eva-
sion of cartel); Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 
26 J.L. & EcoN. 497 (1983) (tying can reduce overinvestment in search). 
10. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-52 (9th Cir. 
1971); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics Of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985); cf. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 8, at 39 (discussing incentives for franchisees to free ride); Paul H. Rubin, 
The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 
223, 228 (1978) (same). 
11. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 
F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 50-52; Little Caesar Enters. v. 
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 19, 23-27. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50. 
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tional analysis is premised on an outdated preoccupation with monopo-
listic explanations for nonstandard contracts and misconceives the 
relationship between market power, on the one hand, and tying con-
tracts that serve a procompetitive objective, on the other. In particular, 
this article demonstrates that a tying contract that reduces agency costs 
and enhances franchise goodwill by eliminating opportunistic free rid-
ing by franchisees is not "forced" on purchasers nor is it otherwise the 
result of market power. Instead, a contract that produces these benefits 
is presumably the result of a purely voluntary arrangement that divides 
between the parties those gains resulting from partial integration, inte-
gration that would occur regardless of whether the franchisor possessed 
market power. 
Given the low transaction costs inherent in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship, no rational franchisor with market power would 
use that power to impose such a tying requirement. Instead, the parties 
would negotiate for the term, and the franchisor would exercise its 
power simply by raising the price of the tying product: here, the 
franchise opportunity itself. Denomination of the benefits created by 
such a term as a "justification" or an "affirmative defense," then, im-
properly equates franchise tying contracts with other, presumptively an-
ticompetitive, arrangements. Unlike the ordinary rule of reason or 
merger analysis, where the presence of market power suggests that 
procompetitive benefits coexist with anticompetitive effects, proof of 
procompetitive effects in the franchise context suggests that no legally 
cognizable anticompetitive effects are present. Thus, the partial equilib-
rium welfare analysis employed in other antitrust contexts and premised 
necessarily upon the presence of high transaction costs is ill-suited for 
the evaluation of tying contracts that produce these procompetitive ef-
fects, and, in fact, is unduly biased against such contracts. 
The bias inherent in such a partial equilibrium analysis does more 
than lead to incorrect results. It leads to less efficient methods of con-
trolling free riding and encourages forward integration by franchisors, 
integration that both destroys efficiencies otherwise realizable via the 
division of labor inherent in the franchise system and retards the growth 
of independent small business. In order to eliminate this bias, courts 
ought to alter the current framework by holding that a franchisor estab-
lishes the prima facie legality of a tying contract by proving that it 
eliminates free riding. Such an approach will not only ensure correct re-
sults; it will truncate the full-blown analysis undertaken when evaluat-
ing tying contracts, thus reducing litigation costs. 
The conclusion offered here has implications beyond the franchise 
context, premised, as it is, on the inapplicability of a partial equilibrium 
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welfare analysis in low transaction cost settings. When the contract 
under scrutiny arises in such a setting, a 'Conventional partial equilib-
rium analysis is ill-suited for a proper evaluation of the restraint. 
J. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]ying agreements serve 
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."14 Yet, the 
Justices have never held that all contracts that condition the sale of one 
product upon the purchase of another are illegal. Instead, the Court has 
developed an elaborate analytical framework, best articulated in Jeffer-
son Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 15 for identifying tying con-
tracts that are the result of anticompetitive "forcing," that is, are im-
posed through the exercise of market power.16 Under this approach, a 
plaintiff may make out a per se violation by proving: (1) the existence 
of separate products; (2) conditioning the sale of one (tying) product on 
the purchase of another (tied) product; (3) the seller's possession of 
power in the market for the tying product; and ( 4) substantial commerce 
in the tied product.17 Proof of these four elements gives rise to a pre-
14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)). 
15. 466 u.s. 2 (1984). 
16. See 466 U.S. at 12-15; Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 
495, 503-04 (1969). As explained below, there are "nonforcing" theories that explain 
how ties can, in some circumstances, have anticompetitive effects. The rationale of the 
per se rule, however, focuses on the threat of forcing. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
12 ("Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying ar-
rangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force 
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such 'forcing' is 
present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the 
Sherman Act is violated.") (emphasis added); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. 
Supp. 884, 895 (B.D. Mich. 1995) (forcing constitutes a necessary element in franchise 
tying case); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 
1231-33 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (same). 
17. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 
(1992); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18. It should be noted that courts do not al-
ways deem a franchise opportunity - the ability to operate under the franchise trade-
mark - to be a separate, tying product. Instead, courts generally !md the trademark to 
be a separate product only in those circumstances in which a so-called "business format 
franchising" is involved, that is, where the franchisee produces the franchise product, 
and distributes it under the franchise trademark. If, by contrast, the franchisor is the ulti-
mate source of the product, such that the trademark merely identifies the supplier, 
courts will not deem the trademark or the opportunity a separate, tying product. See 
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(explaining this distinction). However, where the franchise is of the latter, "source" va-
riety, courts often treat the franchise product itself as a separate, tying product. See, e.g., 
Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 478-81 (3d 
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sumption that the challenged arrangement is an illegal tie, that is to say, 
that the seller is using its market power over the tying product to 
"force" a buyer to purchase the tied product, and that the arrangement 
is, on balance, anticompetitive.18 Despite the "per se" label, however, 
this presumption is not conclusive. Some lower courts, at least, still ad-
mit the possibility of an "affirmative defense," in which a defendant 
endeavors to show that the arrangement is necessary to advance a 
procompetitive objective that outweighs the tie's anticompetitive 
effects.19 
When a plaintiff is unable to establish the elements of a per se vio-
lation, courts analyze the arrangement under the rule of reason.20 Under 
this approach, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the type of presumption 
present in the per se context, but instead must prove directly that the tie 
produces anticompetitive effects that outweigh its justiflcations.21 Of 
course, the same procompetitive benefits that might be proffered as jus-
Cir. 1992) (en bane) (treating Chrysler automobiles as the tying product); Grappone, 
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1988) (treating 
Subaru automobiles as the tying product). 
Most lower courts also require a showing that the seller has an "economic inter-
est" in the sale of the tied product. See, e.g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 
934 F.2d 1566, 1578-79 (11th Cir. 1991). In addition, at least one circuit may require a 
finding of an anticompetitive effect in the market for the tied product. See A.O. Smith 
Corp. v. Lewis, Overbeck & Furman, 979 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1992). 
18. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-15. 
19. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-1350 
(9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc., v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 
1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1987) (entertaining but ultimately rejecting a defense); United 
States v. Jerrold Electronics. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (B.D. Pa. 1960), affd., 365 U.S. 
567 (1961) (per curiam); see also Little Caesar Enters., 895 F. Supp. at 888 (noting 
franchisees' failure to challenge the tie of proprietary items produced under a secret 
formula). The Supreme Court has never approved the assertion of an affirmative de-
fense to a tying contract. In Jerrold Electronics, the government did not challenge in the 
Supreme Court the district court's fmding that the tie was necessary to the development 
of a new product. See Jerrold Electronics, 365 U.S. at 567. Thus, the Court only af-
firmed that portion of the District Court's decision holding that the tie was no longer 
justified once the defendant had established itself in the new market. See 365 U.S. at 
567. Moreover, the Court has asserted that most, if not all, procompetitive purposes 
could be served by means "less restrictive" than a tie. See sources cited infra note 60. 
20. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-31; Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 482-83 
(holding that, absent a showing of market power, courts will analyze a tie under the rule 
of reason); Grappone, 858 F.2d at 796-98 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (reaching the same 
conclusion). But see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 
756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.) (holding that market power is nec-
essary to prove a violation under the rule of reason). 
21. See Grappone, 858 F.2d at 799 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31). 
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tifications for a per se violation are a1so relevant when such ba1ancing 
occurs.22 
It is against this backdrop that some lower courts have long enter-
tained what might be called a "franchise goodwill" defense- an as-
sertion that the tie ensures that franchisees use inputs of a qua1ity suffi-
cient to maintain the image of the franchise, which is usua1ly associated 
with a trademark.23 For instance, in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,24 the 
Ninth Circuit entertained, but rejected, Chicken Delight's assertion that 
a requirement that its franchisees purchase from it cooking equipment, 
food ingredients, and paper products was on ba1ance procompetitive be-
cause it ensured that its trademark was associated with a certain level of 
quality.25 However, in Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 
Inc.,26 the court, assuming arguendo that the plaintiff had established 
the elements of per se liability, found Mercedes's requirement that its 
dea1ers use only Mercedes or Mercedes-approved replacement parts jus-
tified by goodwill concerns, particularly in light of the jury's finding 
that no less restrictive a1temative adequately advanced Mercedes's inter-
est in qua1ity controi.27 
Economists have formalized this franchise goodwill defense, dem-
onstrating that, in some cases, such contractua1 requirements are a re-
sponse to the agency costs created by the division of labor that charac-
terizes the franchisor-franchisee relationship. By separating the 
ownership of a trademark from its control, the franchise system a1lows 
a division of labor that creates substantia] efficiencies.28 These efficien-
22. See, e.g., Grappone, 858 F.2d at 799-800 (relying in part on Jerrold Electron-
ics for the conclusion that the tie helped the defendant break into a new market). 
23. See, e.g., Moztlrt Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51; Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 
1040-41; see also Midwestern Waffles Inc., v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 713 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
24. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). 
25. 448 F.2d at 51. 
26. 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). 
27. See 833 F.2d at 1349. But see Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42 (finding 
the same arrangement illegal given the presence of a less restrictive alternative). Moztlrt 
Co. and Metrix Warehouse are compared in J. Brady Dugan, Note, Contrasting Ap-
proaches to Economic Justifications in Tying Arrangement Analysis: Metrix. Warehouse 
v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft and Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North 
America, 12 GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 139 (1989). 
28. Scholars have identified several efficiencies created by the franchise system. 
See, e.g., James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: 
The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. EcoN. 401 (1987) (stating that franchising leaves 
the control of operations in the hands of the party who better internalizes the benefits of 
its actions, the franchisee); Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy IT, Franchising: 
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. EcoN. J. 572, 574-75 (1976) (noting that 
franchising allows parties to realize the benefits of differing economies in the produc-
tion of a service and the production of a national brand name); Klein & Saft, supra note 
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cies, however, come with a price. In relinquishing its control over the 
trademark, the franchisor leaves the quality of the products distributed 
under the mark in the hands of individual franchisees. Under these con-
ditions, the reputation associated with the franchise trademark assumes 
the characteristics of a collective good, as no franchisee can exclude 
other franchisees from the benefits that flow from its own maintenance 
of high quality standards.29 
In such circumstances, individual franchisees will face insufficient 
incentives to produce quality products that maintain the trademark's 
reputation.30 The benefits from any one franchisee's investment in qual-
ity will flow in large part to other franchisees. Concomitantly, each in-
dividual franchisee will recognize that it will enjoy the benefits of such 
investment by other franchisees. Each franchisee will thus fmd it ra-
tional to engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the 
franchise system- behavior that involves the sort of "free riding" that 
usually characterizes the production of collective goods.31 This free rid-
ing will consist of attempts to "cheat" customers, by providing them 
with products inferior to those ordinarily associated with the trademark, 
presumably at the same price charged by those fellow franchisees who 
maintain a higher level of quality.32 While this behavior might breach 
10, at 350 n.20 (agreeing with Caves and Murphy); Rubin, supra note 10, at 226-30 
(noting that franchising facilitates the efficient policing of franchisee investments in 
quality); see also Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine LaFontaine, Costs of Control: The 
Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 417, 429 
(1994) ("[E]vidence in the literature suggest[s] that costs are higher in company-owned 
than in franchised outlets of the same chain."). 
29. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228; see also MANcUR OLSON, THE LoGic OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-16 (1965) (defming collective goods). 
30. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10; G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, 
The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 503, 504-05 (1985). 
31. See Wn..LIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 39 (explaining 
generally the incentives of franchisees to free ride); Rubin, supra note 10, at 228. 
32. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 349-50; Mathewson & Wmter, supra note 
30, at 506-08; Rubin, supra note 10, at 228. Put another way, the ordinary franchise ar-
rangement is characterized by negative externalities - externalities that can be imposed 
by one franchisee on its fellows via a suboptimal investment in quality. As Professor 
Rubin explains: 
What is involved is a classic externality problem. If any one franchisee allows 
quality to deteriorate, he will generate revenue because consumers perceive him 
as being of the same quality as other stores with the same trademark. Thus, if one 
franchisee allows the quality of his establishment to deteriorate, he benefits by 
the full amount of the savings from reduced quality maintenance; he loses only 
part of the costs, for part is borne by other franchisees. All franchisees would 
lose something as a result of this deterioration in one franchise: consumers would 
have less faith in the quality promised by the trademark. 
Rubin, supra note 10, at 228; see also Mathewson & Wmter, supra note 30, at 506-10 
(discussing the "horizontal externality" problem). 
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the franchise contract,33 detection and punishment of such deviancy may 
well be prohibitively expensive.34 By ensuring that franchisees purchase 
inputs of a certain quality, then, tying contracts can prevent a deteriora-
tion in the reputation of the franchise product and trademark. 
Market mechanisms - for example, customer exit - often will 
not deter such conduct. This is especially the case when customers 
make one-time purchases and cannot readily observe quality before-
hand.35 Such customers are unable to protect themselves, and franchis-
ees have little incentive to maintain individual, franchise-specific repu-
tations for quality.36 Thus, one commentator reports that, for many 
years, Standard Oil Company owned all service stations operating under 
its trademark along interstate highways, where few patrons are repeat 
customers, but allowed owner-operated franchise stations in neighbor-
hoods where repeat trade was prevalent.37 Presumably, the lack of re-
peat business along highways sharply reduced franchisees' incentives to 
maintain quality. Such complete vertical integration is a drastic remedy, 
which eliminates the gains inherent in the franchise system.38 Yet, ab-
33. Even if such conduct does not violate the explicit terms of the franchise agree-
ment, it may well violate an explicit or implicit "best efforts" term. See Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 
llh-30 (1981). 
34. See Tunothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 
MINN. L. REv. 521, 523, 575-80 (1981) (arguing that shirking by franchisees is a para-
digmatic example of opportunistic behavior). 
35. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 350-51. 
36. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228. 
37. See Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of 1ie-In Sales: Re-
examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 754-55 n.114 (1987); see also 
Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 348 n.15 ("Chicken Delight appears to have assured 
high-quality supply by granting franchisees fairly large exclusive territories and locating 
their outlets off the main highways."). All customers need not be repeat customers for 
such a strategy to be successful. Instead, so long as a franchisee cannot distinguish be-
tween repeat and one-time customers and discriminate against the latter, the presence of 
a significant proportion of repeat customers should induce the appropriate investment in 
quality. See Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 
468, 489 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REv. 630, 637-39 (1979) (explaining how, absent discrimination, the presence of 
some knowledgeable consumers in a market can prevent sellers from exploiting those 
consumers that are not well-informed). 
38. See supra note 28; cf. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 57 n.26 (1977) (holding that courts should not, under guise of protecting distribu-
tors, adopt rules that encourage manufacturers to integrate forward); Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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sent this or some other method of control, competition between 
franchise systems will suffer and output will fall. 39 
Such shirking may even extend to the refusal by franchisees to 
provide an optimal level of goods or services ancillary to the "primary" 
product, either at the point of sale or in the aftennarkets.40 In Grappone, 
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc.,41 for instance, the court scrutinized 
an agreement that conditioned the right to sell Subaru automobiles on 
the dealer's agreement also to purchase a minimum number of spare 
parts. This arrangement may well have prevented dealers from free rid-
ing on the provision of parts and service by others.42 Similarly, in 
Yentsch v. Texaco,43 the court evaluated Texaco's requirement that its 
dealers maintain clean washrooms and provide S&H Greenstamps and 
free glassware to customers who purchased a minimum amount of gaso-
line.44 Such requirements were likely designed to present a unifonn 
bundle of services to the public, and to prevent individual franchisees 
from luring consumers to nonconforming stations under the false expec-
tation that such services would be available. 
Not all tying contracts produce such procompetitive benefits; often 
conditions are not conducive to free riding by franchisees, thereby sug-
gesting an ulterior purpose for these contracts.45 However, even when a 
franchisor can demonstrate that a tying contract prevents free riding, 
current law rejects attempts to justify the agreement on this basis. 
Under current law, a demonstration that such a contract prevents oppor-
tunistic behavior does not render the challenged arrangement legal. In-
39. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 349-51 (arguing that free riding results in 
lower demand for franchise products); cf. Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers 
Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). Of course, the free riding attributed to 
franchisees in this context differs from that ordinarily encountered in the vertical con-
text In the latter case, customers are in a real sense in complicity with the distributor 
who provides inferior service. In the former, the customer is a victim. See Klein & Saft, 
supra note 10, at 351. 
40. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228 (arguing that free riding extends to franchise 
relationship generally); see also note 17, supra (describing the so-called "source" 
franchises, pursuant to which the franchisee distributes a product manufactured by the 
franchisor). 
41. 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988). 
42. See also Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 
1360 (4th Cir. 1987) (addressing a requirement that dealers carry a full line of automo-
biles); cj. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 55 (noting that exclusive territories can facilitate 
aftermarket service); Kevin J. Arquit, Resale Price Maintenance: Consumers' Friend or 
Foe?, 60 .ANrrmusT LJ. 447, 453 (1992) (concluding that resale price maintenance 
can assure optimal service in aftermarkets). 
43. 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980). 
44. See 630 F.2d at 49-50. 
45. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 357-58 (suggesting that Chicken Delight 
utilized tying contracts to collect rents appropriated by price discriminating franchisees). 
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stead, the franchisor must prove that the benefits of the tie outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects that are presumed to exist once a per se ,violation 
has been "established."46 Courts do not engage in this balancing explic-
itly, but instead scrutinize such an assertion by means of a less restric-
tive alternative test.47 This test requires courts to reject any asserted jus-
tification for a tie, including a "franchise goodwill" justification, when 
the procompetitive objectives of the contract could be achieved through 
less restrictive means.48 In Chicken Delight, for instance, the court re-
jected a "goodwill defense," fmding that the defendant could have 
specified in the franchise contract the attributes of the inputs in ques-
tion.49 Conversely, when a tie is the least restrictive means of achieving 
its objectives, for example, when it is impossible to specify all the at-
tributes of the input(s) in question, or when those inputs are produced 
pursuant to a trade secret, courts uniformly sustain the defense.50 
The hostility toward procompetitive justifications exhibited by the 
shifted burden of proof and the less restrictive alternative test flows nat-
urally from the economic theory of ties adopted by the Supreme Court, 
as well as the economic assumptions governing balancing approaches in 
antitrust law generally. In Standard Oil, on which lower courts often 
rely for the application of the less restrictive alternative test,51 the Court 
discussed a different affirmative defense - the so-called "false attribu-
46. See supra note 19. 
47. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 
(9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 
1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1987); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) (rejecting the assertion 
that a tie eliminated "false attribution problem" given the purported availability of less 
restrictive alternative); Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42; Midwestern Waffles, 
Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712-13 (11th Cir. 1984); Chicken Delight, 448 
F.2d at 51; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
483-84 (1992) (holding that summary judgment was improper given evidence that the 
tie was not necessary to ensure quality). 
49. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51; accord Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-
42. 
SO. See Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1349-50 (finding that the tie was justified in light 
of the jury's finding that no less restrictive alternative existed); Krehl v. Baskin Robbins 
Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.l2 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that when the "alleged 
tied product is manufactured pursuant to secret formulae, the specification alternative is 
not available"); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1964) (fmding 
the proposed specifications for substitute products too detailed and complex); see also 
Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 888 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting the 
franchisees' failure to challenge the tie of certain proprietary items). 
51. See Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040 n.12 (citing Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 
306); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51 (quoting Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306). 
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tion defense" -in some detail.52 The Court suggested that, if use of a 
particular input enhanced the quality of the service ultimately supplied 
to consumers, distributors would purchase the input willingly, that is, 
without a contractual requirement.53 Thus, the Court continued, the 
presence of such a requirement indicated that market power was being 
exercised: "[O]nly the prospect of reducing competition would per-
suade a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the sup-
ply of the tying device ... could induce a buyer to enter one."54 In-
deed, the Court continued, the presence of market power itself suggests 
that a defendant will employ a tie to "extend" that power.55 
This explanation of ties reflected the spirit of the times, a spirit 
that took as a given the allocation of economic tasks between intrafrrm 
production, on the one hand, and market transactions, on the other.56 
Such an approach flowed naturally from industrial organization's exclu-
sive focus on price theory.57 Under this approach, all contracts that de-
parted from some preconceived allocation of tasks between firms and 
the market were seen as symptoms of the exercise of monopoly 
power.58 Professor Coase summed up this intellectual climate nicely: 
52. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 305-06. Of course, the false attribution defense 
is only analogous, and not identical, to the franchise goodwill defense, insofar as the 
former does not depend on the possibility of free riding. Still, lower courts rely on Stan· 
dard Oil's discussion in both contexts. See supra note 51. 
53. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306 ("If the manufacturer's brand of the tied 
product is in fact superior to that of competitors, the buyer will presumably choose it 
anyway."); accord Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 
(1953) ("[A]ny intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choos-
ing buyers to select it over others, anyway."); Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1041 
(quoting same); see also Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 
(1969) ("[B]ecause tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose 
that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable re-
straint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie."). 
54. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306; cf. Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpil-
lar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1232 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (fmding that a contractual provi-
sion requiring the purchase of the tied item itself establishes the existence of forcing); 
Little Caesar Enters., 895 F. Supp. at 896 (same). 
55. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306. 
56. See Wn.LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 7. 
57. See RH. COASE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A PROPOSAL FOR RE. 
SEARCH, reprinted in RH. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 57, 60-
61 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION]; see also Wn.LIAMSON, 
EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 7; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable An· 
titrust Policy, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1696, 1701 (1986) ("Practices that look monopolistic 
(because they involve cooperation) may be beneficial. Cooperation is essential in com-
plex economic endeavors. How much is too much is a thorny problem."). 
58. See Wn.LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 19, 370-71 
("Since there [was] nothing to be gained by introducing nonstandard terms into market-
mediated exchange, the use of contract restraints was presumed to have anticompetitive 
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One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is 
that if an economist finds something - a business practice of one sort or 
other - that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explana-
tion. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number of ununder-
standable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monop-
oly explanation is frequent.59 
1)ring contracts are such a suspect practice. Instead of relying on 
the market- the buyer's unfettered choice- such arrangements allo-
cate by contract the selection of the tied product to the seller of the ty-
ing product, and thus depart from a preconceived division of responsi-
bilities between buyer and seller. A focus on price theory as the 
criterion for interpreting contractual arrangements then, naturally leads 
one to suspect that tying contracts are "forced" on an unwilling pur-
chaser through the exercise of monopoly power. Given these premises, 
it is perhaps not surprising that courts have required the defendant to 
show that the challenged tie is the only means of preserving goodwill.60 
Similar approaches govern other presumptively illegal arrangements.61 
In the rule of reason context, proof that a contract restrains trade 
- usually accomplished by proof of market power - creates a pre-
sumption that the restraint is on balance anticompetitive and hence un-
lawful.62 The defendant can rebut this presumption and thus avoid a di-
rected verdict only by adducing evidence from which the fact !mder 
could conclude that the restraint serves procompetitive objectives that 
purpose and [e]ffect"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Rachet in Antitrust Law?, 60 
TExAs L. REv. 705, 715 (1982) (discussing the "inhospitality tradition of antitrust"). 
59. COASE,lNoUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 67. 
60. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); International 
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); ffiM v. United States, 298 U.S. 
131, 138-40 (1936); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. lnlage Technical Servs., Inc., 504 
u.s. 451, 483-84 (1992). 
61. Indeed, as suggested earlier, such a showing is generally a sufficient condition 
as well. See ABA SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCITONS IN ClVIL ANTITRusT CASES B-103 
(1990). Such an approach in this per se context is thus less hostile to assertions that 
procompetitive benefits justify a restraint than the approach taken in the rule of reason 
and merger contexts. In these contexts, the absence of a less restrictive alternative is 
merely a necessary condition for showing that a restraint or merger is ultimately 
procompetitive. See, e.g., 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRusT LAW 'li 1507 (1986); 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at§ 4.0 (stating that agencies will 
not challenge merger that is the least restrictive means of producing efficiencies that 
outweigh procompetitive effects). 
62. See Capital lnlaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 
537, 543-46 (2d Cir.·1993) (holding that proof of market power or a naked restraint of 
output shifts the burden to the defendant); Chicago Prof!. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. 
NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a naked restraint on output 
shifts the burden of justification to defendant). 
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outweigh its anticompetitive effects.63 At this point, the ultimate burden 
of proof shifts back to the plaintiff, who can meet this burden by prov-
ing that either: (1) the objectives could be realized through a less re-
strictive arrangement, or (2) the agreement's benefits are outweighed by 
its anticompetitive effects.64 Similarly, where a proponent of a merger 
that facilitates the exercise of market power asserts that efficiencies cre-
ated by the arrangement outweigh any anticompetitive effects, courts 
and enforcement agencies require a showing that the efficiencies could 
riot be achieved through a less anticompetitive transaction. 65 These tests, 
of course, constitute a form of partial equilibrium welfare analysis and 
thus only re-emphasize the influence of price theory on antitrust 
jurisprudence.66 
As shown below, the preoccupation with monopoly explanations 
identified by Professor Coase has led courts and scholars astray in their 
assessment of certain tying arrangements.67 In particular, courts have 
misconceived the relationship between market power, on the one hand, 
and tying contracts that serve procompetitive objectives, on the other. 
Once the nature of this misconception is exposed, it becomes clear that 
the similar treatment of franchise tying contracts and presumptively an-
ticompetitive restraints and mergers is not justified. Instead, a showing 
that a tie produces significant benefits undermines the premises that 
63. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1993); Capital 
Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 61, at <JI 1507b ("Once the 
plaintiff satisfies his burden of persuasion on the existence of a significant restraint, he 
will prevail unless the defendants introduce evidence sufficient to allow the tribunal to 
find that their conduct promotes a legitimate objective."). 
64. See Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679; see also 
Chicago Projl. Sports, 961 F.2d at 675. But cf. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the least restrictive alternative test); 
Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 
TUL. L. REv. 1163, 1194 (1988) (suggesting that law on less restrictive alternatives is 
unclear). 
65. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 4.0; United 
States v. IVACO, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1425-27 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the 
justification that a merger would facilitate the creation of a new product was not cogni-
zable when such a product could be created by a less anticompetitive means). 
66. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 107-15; WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 369 (discussing the influence of "partial equilibrium welfare ec-
onomics model" in antitrust analysis); Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 2; see 
also Wesley J. Liebeler, Comments, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 335, 335-36 (1985) (noting that 
the rule of reason is employed "to balance the gains from increased efficiency against 
the losses from increased market power."). But see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven 
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over 
Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 278 (1986) (arguing that the rule of reason analysis accounts 
for efficiency claims "principally by subjecting assertions of anticompetitive effects to 
close scrutiny when plausible efficiency arguments are offered"). 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 68-81. 
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support this similar treatment. Thus, such a showing by a franchisor 
should rebut any presumption that the contract has been "forced" on a 
purchaser through an exercise of market power, a necessary condition 
to per se liability. 
II. A MISGUIDED INQUIRY 
A. Missing the Mark 
As shown above, current law relies on an elaborate framework to 
sort procompetitive from anticompetitive tying contracts, a system par-
allel to that employed in other antitrust contexts.68 Given this legal land-
scape, economists and others who assert the procompetitive benefits of 
such contracts and who attack results in particular cases emp:hasize the 
perceived lack of market power in most franchise contexts, as well as 
the absence of less restrictive alternatives that would advance the 
franchisor's procompetitive objectives.69 Professors Klein and Saft, for 
instance, concede that franchisors possess some economic power as a 
result of the product differentiation associated with their respective 
trademarks.70 They argue, however, that such power should not be 
deemed "market power" for antitrust purposes, and that the true market 
for the tying product is the market for all franchise opportunities, not 
simply the market for franchises in what might constitute a relevant 
product market for other antitrust purposes.71 They also assert that pur-
68. See supra text accompanying notes 14-27, 45-46. 
69. See Dugan, supra note 27, at 152; Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 345; Rubin, 
supra note 10, at 232. 
70. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 354-61. This concession seems compelled 
by economic evidence and theory. See Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28, at 437-
38 (concluding that McDonald's purposely leaves economic rents downstream for 
franchisees). 
71. Thus, even if consumers might view "fast food," for instance, as a relevant 
market, Klein and Saft would argue that the market in which to measure a franchisor's 
market power vis-a-vis prospective franchisees is a market that includes, for instance, 
the opportunity to operate a gasoline station. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 356; 
Rubin, supra note 10, at 232. Others have suggested that, even if the market for the ty-
ing product is defined more narrowly, the Jefferson Parish defmition of "market 
power" will "doom" the franchise tying cases. See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Mor-
ton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1984) (opinion of Posner, J.) (dicta). As 
shown below, Judge Posner's prediction has proven premature in light of the Court's re-
cent Eastman Kodak decision. See infra text accompanying notes 73-77. Moreover, 
whether "doomed" or not, franchise tying cases have continued to make their way 
through the federal courts long after the, Jefferson Parish decision. See, e.g., Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996); Roy 
B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994); Town Sound 
and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); 
Faulkner Advertising Assocs. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990); 
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portedly less restrictive alternatives will not advance procompetitive 
objectives equally well as outright requirements.72 
These critiques of current doctrine, while no doubt powerful in and 
of themselves, are ultimately inadequate to the task of creating a com-
prehensive method of analyzing tying arrangements in the franchise 
context. As an initial matter, these attacks do not account for the Su-
preme Court's recent Kodak decision, which found that the existence of 
relationship-specific investments can confer "market power" on a man-
ufacturer, even when that manufacturer has no power in the market for 
the product in question.73 Indeed, some scholars have suggested that 
Kodak requires a fmding that market power is present whenever a seller 
faces a downward sloping demand curve, even if such power flows 
from nonstructural factors such as the presence of uninformed buyers.74 
Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988); Grap-
pone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Mozart Co. v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. 
v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987); Queen City Pizza, 
Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Paul E. Volpp Tractor 
Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Little Caesar En-
ters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling 
Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. CV-90-4005(81), 1993 WL 741551 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1993). Fur-
ther, the approach offered here would dispense with any inquiry into market power 
when procompetitive effects are present, thus rendering procompetitive arrangements 
impervious to the fluctuating defmitions of market power that have emanated from the 
Supreme Court over the past several decades. See also infra text accompanying notes 
128-35; cf. Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (assuming, arguendo, the presence of mar-
ket power but fmding the tie justified). 
72. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54. Professor Klein places similar em-
phasis on the absence of market power at the time of contracting in a recent commen-
tary criticizing the Kodak decision. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Ec-
onomic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. Cr. EcoN. REv. 43, 53 (1993). It should be noted 
that, while Professors Klein and Saft advocate the adoption of a rule of reason approach 
in the tying context generally, they do not explain how a fact fmder is to weigh the 
procompetitive benefits of such contracts against their anticompetitive effects. The mere 
fact that a less restrictive alternative is also less effective, of course, does not prove that 
procompetitive effects predominate. This article, by contrast, argues that the presence of 
such procompetitive effects ipso facto suggests the absence of any anticompetitive im-
pact, thereby rendering superfluous any inquiry into market power or anticompetitive 
effect of the sort ordinarily associated with the rule of reason. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 138-41. 
73. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 
'lfli 1709.2a-c (Supp. 1995); Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect 
Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 
193, 200 (1993). 
74. See Arthur, supra note 8, at 54-56; Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through 
Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 Mo. L. REv. 336 
(1993). Such an approach would be a throwback to the pre-Jefferson Parish days, 
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Such "nonstructural" market power, of course, is the very type that 
Klein and Saft concede that franchisors possess.75 Thus, one scholar 
concluded that, if Kodak means what it says, "[f]loodgates would open 
for franchisees to sue franchisors. " 76 Franchisees, sometimes relying on 
the reasoning of Kodak, continue to allege that franchisors with tiny 
shares of any "franchising market" possess "market power. "n 
More important, such attacks suffer from a basic flaw, namely the 
implicit assumption that the presence or absence of some form of mar-
ket power is necessarily relevant to a determination of whether ties are 
ultimately anticompetitive. This approach in turn seems to follow from 
the common assumption that tying contracts are "forced" on purchasers 
through the exercise of market power, whether or not they produce 
procompetitive benefits.78 Similar assumptions underlie judicial state-
where the slightest product differentiation constituted "economic power" of the sort 
necessary for a per se violation. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) 
(finding that a copyright confers economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 
F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that a trademark confers such power); see also 
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court's defini-
tion of market power is inconsistent with Jefferson Parish). 
75. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 357 (arguing that franchisors face down-
ward sloping demand curves as a result of product differentiation); see also Arthur, 
supra note 8, at 33-36 (product differentiation can confer "market power" in the form 
of a downward sloping demand curve). 
76. Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 
-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANrrrn.usT LJ. 759, 766 (1994). 
77. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1062-
63 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Plaintiff's 1st Amended Complaint Cj[ 64, Little Caesar Enters. v. 
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (alleging the possession of market power by 
Little Caesar); Plaintiff's 2d Amended Complaint Cj[ 329, Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bot-
tling Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. CV-90-4005(SJ), 1993 WL 741551 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1993) 
(alleging the possession of market power by Canada Dry because plaintiffs "are for all 
practical purposes locked into their distributorships"). 
78. See Klein, supra note 72, at 53 ("When a tie is anticipated and, therefore, a 
'hold-up' is not occurring, it is clear that the level of competition should be measured 
before the buyer makes any specific investments. If the market at this point in time is 
competitive, then the tie is merely part of the freely negotiated competitive price."). 
The negative implication of this statement, of course, is that when true market power 
exists, the tie is not "freely negotiated," that is, it is "forced" on an unwilling fran-
chisee. See RicHARD A PoSNER. ANrrrn.usT LAW 175-76 (1976) (arguing that the 
benefits created by an "imposed" tie must be weighed against its anticompetitive ef-
fects, but that the former will usually predominate). Indeed, many apparently believe 
that ties can only be obtained through an exercise of market power. See, e.g., Joseph P. 
Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 
33 V AND. L. REv. 283, 332 (1980) (arguing that the existence of a tie ipso facto estab-
lishes that it was imposed through an exercise of market power); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., 
Tying Arrangements And The Leverage Problem, 61 YALE LJ. 19, 20 (1957) ("To sell 
or lease one commodity, the tying product, advantageously on condition that it be used 
with another commodity, the tied product, requires the existence of monopoly power -
in economic theory, the ability to control supply.") (emphasis added); W. David Slaw-
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ments that such benefits result from a "coerced purchase" of the tied 
item,79 statements that recall the Court's conclusion in Standard Oil that 
any tying contract executed by a finn with market power has been im-
posed against the purchaser's will through the exercise of that power.80 
These assumptions are not attributable to such scholars; they in-
stead flow naturally from the law of tying and its underlying economic 
assumptions.81 Whatever their source, however, the assumptions are 
misguided. A complete account of franchise tying contracts must recog-
nize that, in light of the low transaction costs that characterize the 
franchise relationship, a franchisor will not use whatever market power 
it might possess to "impose" a tie when that tie can produce benefits 
associated with such contractual integration. Thus, the focus on market 
power and less restrictive alternative_s, though perfectly natural given 
the partial equilibrium framework that dominates antitrust law and the 
premises that underlie tying jurisprudence, rests on a false analogy be-
tween procompetitive ties, on the one hand, and beneficial restraints or 
mergers that are characterized by the coexistence of procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects, on the other. While a showing that procompeti-
tive benefits flow from the latter class of conduct simply suggests fur-
ther balancing along the lines of a partial equilibrium welfare analysis, 
economic theory suggests that such an approach is not useful in low 
transaction cost settings - that tying contracts that actually reduce free 
riding are unrelated to any exercise of market power. Thus, a showing 
by a franchisor that a tie produces such effects should negate any pre-
sumption of "forcing" and establish the contract's prima facie legality. 
son, A New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, 30 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 257 (1985) (same); see also Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis 
After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J., 
Wmter 1994, at 263, 285. But see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power 
Through Leverage, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 515, 546 (1985) (arguing that power over a ty-
ing product is not necessary for the creation of certain procompetitive benefits). 
79. See Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.13 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("In some cases, however, this coerced purchase may be justified as neces-
sary to prevent the sale of inferior goods under the franchisor's trademark.") (emphasis 
added). 
80. See Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Metrix Ware-
house, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(contending that if the tied product were superior, the buyer would purchase it "will-
ingly," without a contractual requirement); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc., v. Cater-
pillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (stating that the existence of a 
contractual requirement establishes "forcing"); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith 895 F. 
Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (same). 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68. 
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B. Preventing the Free Ride (Voluntarily) 
Given the assertion that certain tying contracts mitigate free rlding, 
it may seem odd to argue that such contracts are unrelated to economic 
power. After all, such free riding is the result of reputation's status as a 
collective good, a status made possible by the inability of a franchisee 
to charge a price to those who reap the benefits of its use of quality in-
puts.82 Thus, free riding is in reality a symptom of purely voluntary con-
tracts, a symptom that is usually cured by coercion.83 
It would seem, then, that a franchisor would have to use market 
power or some other means of coercion to mitigate the free riding prob-
lem, as no franchisee would voluntarily agree to a contract preventing 
such behavior. Indeed, in other contexts, economists have suggested that 
market power may be exercised to prevent free riding. 84 · 
Such a conclusion would only further complicate the analysis of 
franchise tying contracts. Certainly the realization would call into ques-
tion the Supreme Court's assertion in Standard Oil that beneficial ties 
need not be imposed by an exercise of market power. 85 Still, by conced-
ing that market power is being exercised, this approach would provide 
little guidance to courts ·that must separate procompetitive from an-
ticompetitive ties.86 Indeed, under such a rubric, the least restrictive al-
ternative approach would seem to make· sense as a means of "sifting" 
the exercise of market power out of what otherwise may be a procom-
petitive arrangement; that is, forcing firms to achieve their objectives 
82. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 14-16. 
83. See id. at 12~16; see also Lehnhert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 520 
(1991) (recognizing the compelling state interest in preventing free riding by coercing 
nonunion employees to support a union financially); Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 4~1 
u.s. 209 (1977). 
84. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 145 (arguing that trade associations use monop-
oly power to coerce contributions to support lobbying efforts); Thomas G. Moore, The 
Purpose of Licensing, 4 JL. & EcoN. 93, 114 (1961) (same); cf. Telser, supra note 39, 
at 87 ("[A} necessary condition to a manufacturer's use of resale price maintenance is 
that he must possess some degree of monopoly control over the price of the product be-
cause his product is differentiated in economically relevant respects from competing 
products."). But cf. Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for 
Shareholders or Abridgment of Expression?, 2 WM. & MARY Bn.L RTs. J. 305, 336-37 
(1993) (concluding that corporations mitigate certain free rider problems without exer-
cising market power). 
85. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,306 (1949). 
86. Cf. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: 
The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551, 589 (1991) (arguing that the anticom-
petitive effects of vertical integration coexist with procompetitive benefits, rendering it 
difficult to screen procompetitive practices from anticompetitive ones). 
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with the least possible exercise of market power. 87 Otherwise, parties 
would be at the mercy of juries acting pursuant to instructions that say 
no more than "determine which is larger: the procompetitive or the an-
ticompetitive effect. " 88 
Happily for all concerned, no such result is required. Contrary to 
the suggestion above, the exercise of market power is not necessary for 
the creation of a tying contract that eliminates free riding. Instead, when 
such a contract does create these benefits, bargaining between the par-
ties in a competitive environment will result in such agreements. More-
over, given the propensity of this process to produce these contracts, 
any attempt by a franchisor to "impose" a beneficial tying requirement 
by exercising market power would be an irrational waste of that power, 
requiring, as it would, the franchisor to charge less than the monopoly 
price. Thus, a showing by a franchisor that the tie does, in fact, produce 
these benefits suggests that no market power has been exercised and 
obviates the need for any further balancing. 89 
That the parties would agree freely to such a contractual require-
ment can be shown easily. Assume that a franchisor awards 100 
franchises. In a world in which bargaining is costless, these 100 
awardees would agree collectively to invest in the optimal amount of 
quality to associate with the trademark under which they would oper-
ate.90 More formally, franchisees would agree collectively to invest in 
quality until the marginal dollar invested in superior inputs yielded less 
than one dollar in collective benefits in the form of increased demand 
for the franchise product that results from a reputation for high quality. 
Such an agreement would occur, without the intervention of the 
franchisor and regardless of whether the franchisor possessed market 
power. Each franchisee would recognize that whatever benefits it might 
derive individually from the right to free ride - that is, to spend less 
87. See generally 7 AREEDA, supra note 61, 'l!1505; Grimes, supra note 78, at 
285. 
88. See ABA SAMPLE JURY INsTRUCTIONS IN Cxvn.. ANTITRUST CASES A-7-8; 
cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.ll (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) ("Weighing effects in any direct sense [in a rule of reason case] will usually 
be beyond judicial capabilities."). 
89. Cf. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 278 nn.216-17 (suggesting that 
efficiency "justifications" for suspect conduct are usually assertions that the conduct is 
not suspect - not an exercise of market power in the first place). 
90. This assumes, of course, that these 100 franchisees could differentiate them-
selves from franchisees operating under agreements with other franchisors. Absent such 
differentiation, other franchisees could reap the benefits of investment by the 100. Such 
differentiation, and the resulting reduction in free riding, is one function of trademark 
law. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Per-
spective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 270 (1987). 
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than the optimal amount on inputs - would be outweighed by the indi-
vidual benefits, in the form of increased demand for its products it 
would secure if each of its fellow franchisees refused to exercise that 
same right. Put another way, even though each franchisee would begin 
with the right to impose severe externalities on its fellows by using in-
ferior inputs, bargaining between the parties would result in an agree-
ment not to exercise that right. This foreseeable result, of course, is a 
necessary implication of the Coase Theorem.91 
In reality, significant transaction costs prevent the creation of such 
an agreement. Bargaining over this type of contractual term would 
prove to be intractable, as individual franchisees would have an incen-
tive to "hold out," seeking bribes for their commitment not to free 
ride.92 Indeed, by threatening to "free ride" on the efforts of their fel-
lows, one or a few franchisees could extort most of the benefits of 
maintaining high quality.93 Moreover, enforcement of such an agree-
ment would be impractical. Because actions for breach of contract 
would probably prove to be an inadequate sanction,94 franchisees would 
have to adopt collectively some termination procedure to facilitate self-
help.95 For instance, they could agree to force a sale, upon a majority 
vote, of a franchisee caught shirking. Yet such a mechanism would give 
rise to opportunistic behavior by franchisees, who could threaten termi-
nation of franchises to appropriate their value.96 
91. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 
(1960). 
92. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 40-41. A particularly aggressive franchisee 
could threaten even to engage in quality investment that is suboptimal from an individ-
ual perspective and, by means of such a threat, appropriate to itself gains greater than 
those produced by the proper collective investment in quality. Cf. WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 34 
n.5 (1987). 
93. Cf. OLSON, supra note 29, at 41 ("Whenever unanimous participation is re-
quired, any single holdout has extraordinary bargaining power; he may be able to de-
mand for himself most of the gain that would come from any group-oriented action."); 
Meese, supra note 84, at 322 (arguing that the requirement of unanimous consent for 
corporate speech would create severe holdout problems). 
94. See Muris, supra note 34, at 575 ("[F]ranchisees can 'cheat' on quality in 
ways that are costly to detect and prove. Moreover, clauses specifying elements of qual-
ity will often prove expensive to draft in complete detail and certainly to enforce in 
court .... "). 
95. Cf. Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual 
Arrangements, 92 PAPERS & PRoc. AM. EcoN. AssN. 356 (1980) (concluding that the 
threat of termination by a franchisor can deter shirking); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. 
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. PoL. 
EcoN. 615, 616 (1981). 
96. Cf. Muris, supra note 34, at 577 (describing the incentives of the franchisor to 
engage in such behavior). Such incentives would be particularly keen in this context. 
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In the real world, then, one would not expect such an agreement. 
There is, however, another mechanism for ensuring an optimal invest-
ment in quality and the resulting reputation of the franchise system. As 
sole owner of the franchise trademark, the franchisor internalizes the 
benefits associated with the elimination of free riding. The vehicle of 
such internalization, is, of course, the compensation that the franchisor 
receives for use of the trademark by franchisees. Such compensation 
usually takes two forms: an up-front payment for a franchise opportu-
nity and an annual franchise fee, measured as a percentage of gross rev-
enues.97 By eliminating free riding, then, the franchisor can enhance the 
compensation it receives for the sale of each franchise. Franchisees, of 
course, will be willing to pay more "up front" for the right to partici-
pate in a franchise system not characterized by free riding, and aggre-
gate franchise fees will rise, as reduced free riding translates into higher 
demand and revenues. 
Given its status as sole owner of the franchise trademark, we 
would expect the franchisor to attempt to maximize its revenues by in-
cluding a tying requirement in any contract ancillary to the alienation of 
the franchise trademark.98 Moreover, because the franchisor can refuse 
to part with the trademark absent an agreement to such a term, it can 
exclude from the benefits of quality enhancement those prospective 
franchisees who will not agree to adhere to the requirement. 
Of course, once the standard franchise contract includes such a 
term, individual franchisees might be willing to pay a premium for a 
franchise contract without it. Having received such an atypical contract, 
the maverick could then free ride on the efforts of those franchisees 
who had signed the standard contract and thus were using inputs of suf-
ficient quality. However, any "free riding premium" that a maverick 
would be willing to pay would necessarily be less than the revenue that 
a franchisor would forgo as a result of the failure to include the require-
Unlike franchisors, franchisees have no long-term reputational interest to protect, and 
thus would be more likely to engage in such opportunistic behavior. See id. at 577-78 
(arguing that continuous dealing in franchises by franchisors necessitates the mainte-
nance of reputation and thus deters opportunistic terminations). Moreover, no single 
franchisee would be accountable for such actions, further attenuating whatever reputa-
tional loss would attend termination of a franchise. 
97. See Antony W. Dnes, A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 367, 382 (1993) (noting that the most common method of franchisor com-
pensation is the "coupling of a lump sum with a sales royalty"); Kabir C. Sen, The Use 
of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business-Format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DE-
CISION EcON. 175 (1993). 
98. Cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the 
Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553, 556-57 (1993). 
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ment in the maverick's contract, as other franchisees, recognizing the 
reduced value of the opportunity, would pay less for it, and the 
franchisor would receive lower franchise fees.99 Put another way, while 
the franchisor may "offer" franchise contracts that do not include such 
a requirement, it will do so only at a price higher than any franchisee is 
willing to pay.100 
Thus, even though the franchisor's relinquishment of control over 
the trademark and the resulting division of labor between franchisor and 
franchisee might suggest that each prospective franchisee has the 
"right" to impose externalities on the franchise system by purchasing 
inferior inputs, the parties will instead allocate the right to choose in-
puts to the franchisor. 101 More precisely, where circumstances are con-
ducive to free riding, the franchisor will induce the franchisee prospec-
tively to internalize the externalities resulting from the use of inferior 
inputs by offering to "unbundle" the right to choose inputs from the 
right to employ the trademark for a higher price, a price that reflects the 
harm imposed on the franchise system by the free riding that would fol-
low such unbundling.102 Because this harm, and the resulting higher 
price, are greater than the gain from free riding to any individual fran-
chisee, we would not expect any franchisee to negotiate for such un-
bundling.103 In this way, the law's designation of the franchisor as "sole 
owner" of the franchise trademark ensures that the reputation associ-
99. Indeed, to the extent that franchisors are compensated by franchise fees, fran-
chisees need not "recognize" the deleterious effects of free riding for such bargaining 
to take place. So long as the franchisor can predict the reduction in franchise fees that 
would result from free riding, it will internalize the effects of unbundling the trademark 
from the right to select the franchisee's inputs. Moreover, failure to include such a 
clause in one contract will negate the franchisor's ability to warrant that such clauses 
are included in all contracts. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14. 
100. Cf. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 33-34 (argu-
ing that a seller will charge higher prices for contracts that do not contain safeguards 
that can prevent opportunistic behavior). 
101. See id. at 27 (concluding that nonstandard contracts are often methods of 
properly assigning complex property rights). 
102. Cf. Coase, supra note 91, at 4-6; WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 8, at 33-34. 
103. It bears emphasis here that the franchisor's decision to charge a higher price 
to those franchisees that would opt for a contract without a tying requirement is logi-
cally unrelated to any exercise of market power insofar as that price is justified by the 
higher cost - that is to say, the externalities borne by the franchise system that result 
from a franchisee's failure tq abide by such a requirement See generally United States 
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 55 (1962) (cost-justified price differential does not consti-
tute forcing); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HAR.v. L. REv. 937 (1981) (defining power as the ability to price above 
cost); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 
72 HAR.v. L. REv. 50, 66-67 (1958). 
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ated with the trademark never becomes a collective good in the first 
place.104 
Seen in this light the inclusion of a tying clause can be a form of 
product differentiation that enhances the value of the franchise, value 
that will be divided between the franchisor and franchisees.105 Such dif-
ferentiation consists of more than a promise by an individual franchisee 
to purchase certain inputs only from the franchisor; it also depends on 
each franchisee's knowledge that other franchisees are observing similar 
terms.106 Franchisees cannot observe such adherence directly; they must 
depend on the franchisor to police uniform adherence to the rule.107 
A franchisee cannot observe in advance whether a franchisor has 
included similar terms in prior contracts, or whether the franchisor in-
tends to include them in all future contracts.108 Of course, thoroughly 
rational franchisees will realize that franchisors will include such 
clauses unless doing so reduces the value of the franchise trademark.109 
Less rational franchisees, concerned that a franchisor may act oppor-
tunistically by refusing to include or enforce these terms in some con-
tracts, must rely on a warranty by the franchisor that such terms have 
104. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 357, 360 
(1974) (arguing that the proper assignment of property rights can transfonn a collective 
good into a private one); Epstein, supra note 98, at 556-57 (arguing that the legal as-
signment of property rights should replicate the "sole owner" standard so as to mini-
mize externalities and holdout problems). 
105. In this sense, franchise contracts are analogous to other contracts that are, in 
fact, products. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-15 (1991) (arguing that states compete to pro-
vide the most efficient corporate law in the fonn of enabling statutes that are analogous 
to standard contracts). 
106. See generally R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multi-
lateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 210, 223-24 (1994) (describing the incentives of franchisors to make credi-
ble commitments regarding the uniformity of contractual tenns). 
107. As Professor Rubin explained: 
[W]e must consider what the franchisee is buying when he buys a franchise. The 
main item purchased is the trademark of the franchise. This is valuable because 
consumers have a good deal of infonnation about price and quality sold by estab-
lishments with a given trademark. Consumers have this infonnation precisely be-
cause the franchisor polices franchises and makes certain that quality standards 
are maintained. 
Rubin, supra note 10, at 227-28. 
108. In this way, a franchise is analogous to a durable good, the characteristics of 
which cannot be observed in advance. See generally George A. Akerloff, The Market 
for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 489-90 
(1970). 
109. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text 
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been and will be included and enforced in each contract.110 By giving 
such a warranty a franchisor can expose itself to common law fraud ac-
tions and place a substantial asset- its reputation- at risk.111 Just as 
a corporation can distinguish its securities by making warranties about 
its operation, 112 or as a state can distinguish its corporate law, 113 so too 
can a franchisor distinguish its product by warranting that it will seek 
and enforce requirements that control free riding.114 
Such a warranty need not consist of an explicit contractual clause. 
An oral statement of extrinsic fact - "this is a form contract, the same 
terms apply to everyone" - will suffice.115 Indeed, in many states, 
110. Cf. McMee & Schwartz, supra note 106, at 223-25. Alternatively, a 
franchisor could commit always to offer the same terms to all franchisees. See id. at 
215; Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28, at 430 (noting that "McDonald's typi-
cally allows its franchisees to rewrite their franchise contract at the termination of the 
original agreement, at the [same] terms offered to new franchisees"). Such a commit-
ment would eliminate any possibility that a "maverick" franchisee would be willing to 
pay a franchisor not to include a tying requirement in its contract For, once such a con-
tract was available to the maverick, it would become available to all, thus destroying its 
value to the maverick. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
111. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 461, 470-71 (1981); George L. 
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297, 1303-06 
(1981) (describing the product differentiation theory of warranties). 
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 677 (1984). 
113. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CoRPORATE LAW 
37-44 (1993). 
114. Such differentiation, of course, makes possible the most effective method of 
enforcing the various terms in the franchise contract, including the tying requirement, 
namely, the threat of termination, which deprives the franchisee of the economic rents 
associated with its right to distribute its product under the trademark. See Kaufman & 
Lafontaine, supra note 28 (concluding that McDonald's leaves rents downstream to fa-
cilitate the control of franchisees through the threat of termination); Benjamin Klein et 
al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 
21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978). 
115. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 
1545 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A silent contract does not prevent action based on an antecedent 
lie."); Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 821 F. 
Supp. 802, 806 (D.P.R. 1993) (recounting the allegation that a franchisor "incorrectly 
represent[ed] that these contracts were 'standard' "), vacated, 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 
1994); cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grummon Sys. Support Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
«j[ 69,487, at 66,073 (D. Mass. 1991), affd., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). Indeed, the 
covenant of good faith implied in each contract may itself prohibit differential treatment 
that undermines the value of a franchise opportunity. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat 
Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a covenant of good faith prevents 
a franchisor from destroying "the right of the other party to enjoy the fruits of the con-
tract"); Hentze v. Unverferht, 604 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Til. App. 1992) (same). Moreover, 
contractual terms that differ from those contained in the franchisor's standard contract 
are not enforceable absent disclosure and conscious assent by the franchisee. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 (1979). 
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such a warranty need not be given at all because laws compel the dis-
closure of tying requirements and prohibit discriminatory treatment of 
franchisees. 116 In New York, for instance, a franchisor must register its 
proposed standard franchise agreement with the state, and disclose any 
requirement that a franchisee purchase goods from the franchisor.111 An 
attempt to enforce a provision not included in the registered agreement, 
or failure to enforce one of its terms against certain franchisees, likely 
would be illegal. 118 Finally, legal duties to one side, franchisors possess 
powerful incentives to make and keep such promises. By maintaining a 
reputation for uniform policing, a franchisor will enhance its own 
wealth as well as that of the franchise system as a whole.119 
Moreover, unlike the situation attending our hypothetical agree-
ment between 100 franchisees, there is no potential for a holdout prob-
lem. Such holdouts can only occur when a franchisee possesses the 
right to reduce its investment in quality and sell the resulting goods 
under the same trademark used by the other ninety-nine franchisees. 
Because trademark law protects the franchisor's status as "sole owner" 
by assigning it a true "property right" in the trademark, 120 a franchisee 
can only obtain the right to distribute products under the mark pursuant 
to a contract with the franchisor. As already shown, the franchisor's sta-
116. See MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 27(e) (West 1989) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion among franchises); see also Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning 
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.P.R., pt. 436 (1996). 
117. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 683(2)(k) (McKinney 1996). 
118. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 687 (McKinney 1996) (addressing fraudulent 
and unfair practices). 
119. This is not to say that such negotiation will eliminate the incentive to free 
ride. It is one thing to negotiate a contract; it is another to monitor and enforce compli-
ance with its terms. See generally WD..LlAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 8, at 43-84; Muris, supra note 34. Indeed, as explained infra, the very presence of 
a mechanism that reduces free riding and improves the quality reputation associated 
with the trademark itself creates a stronger incentive on behalf of individual franchisees 
to free ride, in breach of the tying requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 214-
18. This fact does not change the analysis offered here, however. Whether or not indi-
vidual franchisees plan to free ride, the presence of a workable contractual requirement 
that improves the reputational value of the trademark will increase the value of each 
franchise to each potential franchisee. 
120. See Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 
862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Bausch & Lomb's loss of control over its reputation justifies 
a finding of irreparable harm even if it could demonstrate no loss of sales or market 
share."); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (defming a 
"property right" in economic terms as the ability to protect an interest by injunction 
and/or an action for punitive damages); Fred S. McChesney, Deception, Trademark In-
fringement, and the Lanham Act: A Property-Rights Reconciliation, 78 VA. L. REv. 49, 
55 (1992) (noting that economic theory suggests that the law should assign a true prop-
erty right to the owner of a trademark). 
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tus as sole owner will induce it to adopt provisions that ameliorate free 
riding, and to exclude from use of the trademark those who will not 
abide by those terms. Moreover, when a tying requirement can reduce 
free riding, the individual gains from such behavior will be outweighed 
by the resulting harm to the franchise system, and no individual fran-
chisee will be willing to pay a sufficient price to convince the 
franchisor not to include such a requirement.121 In these circumstances, 
there is simply no opportunity for a franchisee to hold out.122 
C. Exercise of Power or Voluntary Agreement? 
The mere fact that a franchisor could convince a franchisee to 
agree to a provision that prevents opportunistic behavior does not, as a 
logical matter, preclude its imposition by an exercise of market power, 
an imposition that would require an antitrust tribunal to treat the con-
tract under scrutiny as a tie and to engage in the sort of partial equilib-
rium welfare analysis described earlier.123 Further analysis, however, 
shows that, in light of the low transaction costs involved, the presence 
of such benefits strongly suggests that a requirement that produces such 
benefits is not a consequence of "forcing" - that a firm with market 
power would not choose to exercise that power by imposing such a re-
quirement. As a result, partial equilibrium welfare analysis is an im-
proper vehicle for evaluating the sort of tying contracts under 
discussion. 
It is axiomatic that firms cannot exercise market power twice.124 A 
firm that possesses market power over the tying product cannot both 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103. 
122. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 557 (arguing that the common law's definition 
and assignment of property rights is designed to minimize the combined costs associ-
ated with externalities and holdouts). See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 62 (1992) (claiming that the common law's choice of assign-
ment of property rights is designed to mitigate the bilateral monopoly problem); Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 120 (reaching the same conclusion). Vigorous competition 
among franchisors does not change this result; so long as those franchisors who adopt 
and adhere to such a policy are able to identify themselves to the public via trademarks 
and to franchisees via warranties, franchisees will, ceteris paribus, prefer contracts with 
those franchisors that prevent free riding by including and enforcing a requirements 
term. 
123. Cf. R. Glenn Hubbard & Robert J. Weiner, Efficient Contracting and Market 
Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, 34 J.L. & EcoN. 25, 25-26 
(1991) (arguing that the efficiency and market power explanations for particular con-
tractual arrangements "are hardly mutually exclusive"); Snyder & Kauper, supra note 
86, at 589 (claiming that the same factors that suggest that vertical integration will pro-
duce procompetitive effects are also necessary conditions for anticompetitive effects). 
124. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39 n.8 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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charge a monopoly price for the product and use its power to "force" a 
customer to take the tied product as wel1.125 A firm that uses its market 
power to induce consumers to purchase an unwanted tied product must 
price below the monopoly level, thereby "convincing" the purchaser to 
take a tied product that is either inferior or more expensive than its 
alternatives. 126 
Thus, firms that possess market power face a choice: exercise that 
power by reducing output and pricing at a monopoly level, or set output 
above the monopoly level, using the resulting reduction in the monop-
oly price to induce consumers, or franchisees, to purchase the "un-
wanted" tied product.127 A firm that uses some quantum of its market 
power to control free riding in this way must increase output above the 
monopoly level and thereby forgo a portion of the monopoly profit that 
it would otherwise earn. More specifically, a franchisor that wishes to 
"impose" an input requirement on prospective franchisees must in-
crease the number of franchises above that which it would otherwise of-
fer, thereby reducing the monopoly overcharge it would otherwise 
enjoy. 
Given these alternatives, it seems clear that, other things being 
equal, a franchisor faced with a choice between employing market 
power to impose a tying requirement or simply agreeing to such a re-
quirement through negotiation would choose the latter course to avoid 
sacrificing part of its monopoly profit. In other words, given the en-
hanced demand for the franchisor's product that results from its war-
ranty that all its franchisees purchase inputs from it, there is simply no 
need to "induce" such an agreement by exercising market power. Any 
such attempt to impose the requirement would constitute irrational be-
havior, behavior that antitrust law does not lightly presume.128 Thus, 
125. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
126. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Grap-
pone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1988); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANrrrn.UST LAW 217-18 (1985) (tying is 
equivalent to raising price); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994) (§ 3 of Clayton Act) (prohibiting 
the sale of or discount on the tying product on the condition that the buyer not purchase 
from the seller's competitor); 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at <JI 1700i (arguing that condi-
tioning the receipt of a discount on the tying product upon the purchase of the tied 
product is indistinguishable from an outright refusal to sell the tying product sepa-
rately). Indeed, some scholars characterize tying as the purchase from customers, here 
franchisees, of the right to exclude the seller's competitors from the tied product mar-
ket. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 215, 219-22. 
127. See Grappone, 858 F.2d at 795. 
128. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-95 
(1986); see also Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1989) 
("A plaintiff who imputes to a defendant actions that 'makeO no economic sense' needs 
solid proof to survive a motion for summary judgment.") (quoting Matsushita E/ec., 
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where a franchisor proves that a tying requirement reduces free riding, 
the very existence of such benefits suggests two things. First, that the 
tie is a voluntary arrangement between the parties for the purpose of re-
alizing the benefits of reducing opportunistic behavior. Second, that 
whatever market power the franchisor might possess is reflected in its 
output of franchises, that is, the number of franchise opportunities it 
awards. In these circumstances, any exercise of market power consists 
solely of a perfectly legal reduction in output that enhances the price of 
such opportunities. 129 
This analysis implicitly assumes the absence of transaction costs 
- that a franchisor can costlessly explain to each potential franchisee 
the substantial benefits associated with a franchise opportunity that is 
not beset with free riders and that the parties can costlessly negotiate 
over its creation. It could be argued that, when such costs are present, 
the franchisor will choose to avoid them by using its market power to 
impose such a requirement outright, thereby avoiding the market failure 
that results from these information costs.130 However, such a strategy 
will be rational only if these costs exceed the cost of imposing such an 
arrangement by the exercise of market power. The latter cost, of course, 
consists of the sum of the net present value of (1) the annual monopoly 
profits foregone to induce acceptance of the tying requirement, and (2) 
the cost of revealing to each franchisee the extent of the discount from 
the monopoly price offered to induce acceptance.131 
Because trademark law assigns to the franchisor a property right in 
the use of the trademark, franchisors need not individually "convince" 
franchisees to "give up" any "right" to free ride. Instead, franchisors 
can include without cost a tying requirement in the standard franchise 
contract which governs the alienation of the trademark.132 The fact that 
475 U.S. at 587). While the franchisor will charge a lower price to those franchisees 
that accept the requirement, this differential does not reflect any exercise of market 
power but instead simply reflects the externalities to the franchise system that would re-
sult from "unbundling" the ownership of the trademark from the right to choose inputs. 
See supra note 103 and accompanying text 
129. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (stating that antitrust law draws a dis-
tinction between the mere enhancement of price and the use of monopoly power to 
"leverage" into other markets). 
130. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 78, at 526-27 (arguing that the rationality of a lever-
aging strategy depends on the prices of substitutes for the tied product). 
131. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213, 
218-19 (1961) (claiming that the rationality of incurring information costs depends on 
the benefits of the search). 
132. See Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 
1990) (noting that standardized contracts reduce transaction costs); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmts. a & b (1979) (same). Indeed, contract law fa-
cilitates this reduction in transaction costs by rendering unenforceable contractual terms 
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franchisees are not willing to pay a sufficient price for the exclusion of 
such a term is not a result of high transaction costs, but instead reflects 
the benefits associated with the elimination of free riding. 133 Thus, the 
bargaining costs associated with creating a source tying requirement are 
most likely lower than the costs of forcing a franchisee to accept it by 
exercising market power. In fact, even when bargaining costs exceed 
the costs of imposing a tying requirement through the exercise of mar-
ket power, such a strategy may still not be rational. In some cases, this 
difference may be less than the loss of income that results from the 
lower demand for the franchises that will presumably occur as franchis-
ees become less educated about the benefits of a tying requirement. 134 
There is a more fundamental reason why firms need not exercise 
market power to induce acceptance of a tying requirement that reduces 
free riding. The use of such power is only necessary when potential 
franchisees recognize the benefits of free riding and must be "con-
vinced" to consent to a provision that renders this behavior more diffi-
cult. Any franchisee, however, that recognizes the value of free riding 
also will recognize the value of its elimination; thus, no "convincing" 
through the exercise of market power will be necessary. 
It should be noted that the analysis offered here does not depend 
upon an assumption that there are no conditions under which a fmn 
that are outside the reasonable expectation of the party signing the standardized con-
tract See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (refusing to enforce 
an unreasonable term in a standard franchise contract when the franchisor had not dis-
closed the existence of the term); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 211(3) 
(1979). Given this background rule, it is less likely that franchisors wiii include such 
terms and thus more likely that franchisees will rely on the franchisor's judgment as to 
the standard terms, reducing the cost of negotiation. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmt b; cf. R.H. COASE, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET. AND THE LAw, supra note 57, at 28 (The law can "make trans-
actions more or less costly by altering the requirements for making a legally binding 
contract"). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104. Of course, if a franchisee were 
willing to pay a sufficient price to induce such unbundling, it could be inferred that the 
benefits of eliminating free riding are attenuated, and franchisors would maximize their 
income by excluding it 
134. Of course, firms will only supply such information to potential franchisees if 
the finn can capture the benefits of such provision, i.e., if potential franchisees cannot 
use that information elsewhere without purchasing the franchise in question. Cf. Telser, 
supra note 39, at 92 n.6 (noting that groups of competitive manufacturers must collec-
tively adopt resale price maintenance in order to avoid free rider problem). See gener-
ally Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & 
BeaN. 491, 503-04 (1981) (describing the positive externalities often inherent in infor-
mation production). However, there is no apparent use for such information outside the 
potential franchise relationship. Thus, one would expect that franchisors can, in fact, in-
ternalize fully the benefits of producing such information. 
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with market power can enhance its profits through a leverage strat-
egy.135 Such a strategy may well be possible in limited circumstances.136 
The Jefferson Parish test, however, is in no way tailored toward identi-
fying these circumstances, but is designed to identify instances of 
"forcing." Thus, proof by a franchisor that the arrangement produces 
procompetitive benefits should, at the least, cast upon the plamtiff a 
burden of proving that the conditions conducive to a leverage strategy 
do, in fact, exist.137 
D. Implications for Balancing 
The realization that tying contracts that produce these benefits are 
logically unrelated to the exercise of market power has powerful impli-
cations for the law governing the "franchise goodwill" justification, 
and for other antitrust balancing tests as well. To begin with, this reali-
zation entirely undermines the premise, articulated in Standard Oil, that 
beneficial tying requirements need not be "imposed" by contract -
that departures from atomistic competition in the form of the existence 
and enforcement of a tying contract necessarily flow from the exercise 
of monopoly power.138 This result in turn calls into question the law's 
135. Cf. BaRK, supra note 7, at 372-73 (claiming that a profitable leveraging 
strategy is impossible); Kaplow, supra note 78 (arguing that a viable leverage strategy 
is possible). 
136. See Alexander C. Larson, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: A Comment, 
63 ANTrrR.usT LJ. 239, 264 (1994) ("[T]he papers produced in the economics litera-
ture on tying and leverage theory do not support the efficacy of tying as a means of 
leveraging under plausible assumptions, and they support the efficacy of tying and 
leveraging only under assumptions that are not plausible."). 
137. In this vein, Tom Arthur has called my attention to the distinction, drawn by 
Franklin Fisher, between "exemplifying theories" and "generalizing theories." See 
Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. 
EcoN. 113, 117-18 (1989). According to Fisher, "[e]xemplifying theory does not tell us 
what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen." /d. at 117. Models showing that 
leverage can be a profitable strategy are exactly of this variety, that is, they simply 
show that a profitable leverage strategy can happen under certain limited conditions. 
See Larson, supra note 136, at 264. No model of which the author is aware concludes 
that the existence of the four Jefferson Parish factors renders a profitable leverage strat-
egy likely, let alone certain. Thus, proof by a franchisor that the contract produces 
procompetitive benefits such that forcing is most likely not present undermines any pre-
sumption of anticompetitive effects. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinc-
tions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). 
138. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Metrix 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir. 
1987) (claiming that no tying requirement would be necessary if the purchase of the 
tied product had beneficial effects); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
917 F. Supp. 1208, 1231-32 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. 
Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the existence of a contractual tying re-
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assumption that benefits created by a per se illegal tie necessarily coex-
ist with anticompetitive effects. 139 
These insights sever any logical connection between the usual par-
tial equilibrium welfare rubric for analyzing mergers and trade re-
straints, and the approach to procompetitive justifications in the tying 
context. The conventional framework, of course, is premised on the ex-
istence of significant transaction costs; absent such costs an exclusion-
ary practice that allowed a firm to obtain market power would not oc-
cur, as consumers and others harmed by the practice would pay the finn 
to abandon it.140 In such a context, a showing of significant procompeti-
tive benefits merely requires the fact fmder to balance those benefits 
against the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement, a process 
spearheaded by the less restrictive alternative test.141 In the latter, such a 
showing rebuts the presumption, articulated in Jefferson Parish, that a 
defendant with market power is exercising that power - that it is en-
gaged in "forcing" - whenever it seeks and enforces a tying contract. 
Absent such forcing, the rationale for per se treatment or any presump-
tion of anticompetitive effects collapses, as does the rationale for the 
balancing implied by a partial equilibrium welfare framework. Thus, re-
gardless whether the plaintiff can prove the four elements of a per se ty-
ing claim outlined in Jefferson Parish, a showing by a franchisor that 
the challenged tie produces significant benefits should rebut any pre-
sumption of forcing and require the conclusion that the arrangement is, 
in fact, an agreement unrelated to the exercise of market power, and 
thus prima facie legal. 
Such an approach would not constitute a rule of per se legality for 
tie-ins. A plaintiff could prevail, for instance, by showing that it paid a 
quirement establishes the element of forcing); see also Bowman, supra note 78, at 19 
(arguing that monopoly power is necessary to require the purchase of the tied item); cf. 
CoASE,lNDusTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 64-68 (discussing economists' 
tendencies to search for monopolistic explanations to business practices they do not 
understand). 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66; cf. Richard Craswell, 7Ying Re-
quirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 
661, 688 (1982) (arguing that firms with market power have incentives to minimize 
costs by adopting efficient contractual terms); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Non-
Substantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1071-75 (1977) (same). 
140. See KENNETH G. ELZINGA & Wn.LIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENAL-
TIES 3-4 (1976); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability 
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67,70 (1968) ("Assuming no transaction costs, 
those who lose from the relative underproduction of monopolies could bribe monopo-
lists to produce more."); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 268-70 (explaining 
how transaction costs prevent parties from investing sufficiently in the preservation of 
competition). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
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premium price for the tied product that was unjustified by any quality 
or efficiency considerations.142 This premium would suggest that the 
benefits were illusory, and that the tying requirement was imposed by 
sacrificing monopoly profits, perhaps as a vehicle for price discrimina-
tion.143 Or, a plaintiff could prevail by showing directly that the benefits 
claimed by the defendant do not exist.144 It warrants emphasis, however, 
that such a showing should not be inferred merely from the existence of 
concentrated markets.14s 
One may fairly ask at this point what this approach would add to 
current law. After all, does not the law's present tying requirement that 
a private plaintiff prove an up charge to obtain damages filter procompe-
titive from anticompetitive ties, and obviate the need for any change in 
current standards?t46 
The framework advocated here would differ markedly from current 
law for three reasons. First, where the government, as opposed to a pri-
vate party, challenges a tie, there is no need to prove an upcharge to ob-
tain equitable relief.147 Second, much of the private litigation over 
franchise tying contracts arises in the context of franchise terminations 
142. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1971) ("To as-
certain whether an unlawful arrangement for the sale of products has caused injury to 
the purchaser, the cost or value of the products involved, free from the unlawful ar-
rangement, must first be ascertained."). 
143. See infra text accompanying notes 202-12. As Richard Craswell suggests, 
such a premium may in some circumstances be justified as a device for risk sharing 
among franchisees, for those franchisees that succeed will pay a higher total premium 
that those that do not. See Craswell, supra note 139, at 686-87. 
144. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483-
84 (1992) (rejecting the "false attribution" defense when the tie did not, in fact, en-
hance quality). For instance, a plaintiff could prevail by showing that the tying require-
ment in question was enforced only sporadically. See Data Gen. Corp., 1991-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 'II 69,487, at 66,073 (D. Mass. 1991). Under the current state of the law, of 
course, lax enforcement may simply suggest that the franchisor fears treble-damage 
suits. It could be argued that a plaintiff should be allowed to prevail by showing that the 
tied product is actually inferior to the product the plaintiff wishes to purchase - that 
the tying requirement is a means of "dumbing down" the product associated with the 
trademark. There may, however, be an independent procompetitive value to such uni-
formity, even at the expense of some increased quality. See Will v. Comprehensive Ac-
counting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that a franchise source tying 
requirement "appears to be useful to clients - perhaps because of the standardized 
method of doing business, perhaps because of Comprehensive's policing of its 
franchisees"). 
145. At any rate, even if current law did countenance such balancing in this con-
text, the presence of a "less restrictive alternative" would not indicate that the chal-
lenged practice was unreasonable. See infra text accompanying notes 171-85. 
146. See Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 52 (outlining the standards for proof of 
damages). 
147. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (1994). 
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or challenges to such contracts by competitors who want to sell the tied 
product.148 In such cases, plaintiffs need not, under current law, prove 
any upcharge, but upon proving a tie, may recover damages flowing 
from the termination itself, or - in the case of a competitor suit -
profits on lost sales of the tied product.149 Third, even when no termina-
tion is involved, and a franchisee simply seeks damages from an 
upcharge, current standards governing proof of antitrust damages are 
less rigorous than those governing proof of a case-in-chief.150 Thus, the 
approach offered here will do a far better job than current law at sorting 
coercive ties from those that constitute voluntary contractual 
integration. 
Failure to implement this approach will do more than simply deter 
the adoption of procompetitive tying contracts. Maintenance of current 
standards also threatens to destroy many of the benefits produced by the 
specialization of function inherent in the franchise system.151 By forcing 
franchisors to adopt less effective contractual methods of preventing op-
portunistic behavior, for instance, these standards may dissuade the 
franchisor from departing with control of the trademark in the first 
place - encouraging the franchisor to integrate forward into the sale 
and distribution of the franchise product.152 Such integration need not 
assume an "all or nothing" character; franchisors simply may decide to 
integrate forward in a higher percentage of locations.153 Not only will 
such integration eliminate the efficiencies flowing from vertical disinte-
gration, it will also diminish the role of independent small businesses in 
the economy.154 
148. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756 
(7th Cir. 1996) (addressing a tennination dispute); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Holly-
matic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995); 
Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 
1992) (en bane) (addressing a suit by a competitor); Faulkner Advertising Assocs., Inc. 
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990) (same), on rehg., 945 F.2d 694 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (en bane) (afflnning lower court per curiam); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. 
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Yentsch v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Tenn. 1995). 
149. See Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1042-45; Yentsch, 630 F.2d at 59 n.19. 
150. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); 
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). 
151. See supra note 28. 
152. See, e.g., Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 356 n.39 (recounting that Jack-in-
the-Box terminated 642 franchises after settling tying litigation). 
153. See Mathewson & Wmter, supra note 30, at 520 (suggesting that excessive 
free riding by franchisees may lead franchisors to integrate forward). 
154. See supra note 28 (detailing various efficiencies created by franchising); cf. 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977) (claiming that 
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When failure to apply the standard suggested here does not lead to 
forward integration, it may still attenuate the benefits of the franchise 
system by inducing franchisors to obtain additional methods of ensuring 
that franchisees actually perform agreements to invest in quality control. 
In the absence of a straightforward and easily monitored tying require-
ment, franchisees may be induced to provide other assurances of per-
formance, such as agreements to make additional investments in assets 
that are specific to the franchise relationship.155 Such investments, of 
course, are inefficient absent their function as an assurance of contrac-
tual performance and will place franchisees at a greater risk of opportu-
nistic behavior. 
ill. PossmLE COMPLICATIONS 
The above analysis suggests that, when a franchise tying contract 
produces significant procompetitive benefits, the arrangement should be 
presumed procompetitive, regardless of the presence of that power. This 
conclusion, however, is premature: a few considerations may counsel a 
more nuanced approach. 
A. Raising Rivals' Costs 
The framework advocated here provides a method of identifying 
those instances in which, despite the presence of market power, a tying 
contract has not been forced on a franchisee by means of an exercise of 
that power. Yet, the mere fact that a contract has not been forced on a 
franchisee through market power does not, ipso facto, require the con-
clusion that the agreement is procompetitive or competitively neutral. 
Indeed, the central insight of the "raising rivals' costs" school is that a 
finn with little or no pre-existing market power can obtain or enhance 
such power by means of a contract that raises the price its competitors 
must pay for inputs.ts6 
A "raising rivals' costs" strategy is at least theoretically possible 
in the franchise context. By requiring franchisees to purchase some in-
courts should not, under the guise of protecting distributors, adopt rules that encourage 
suppliers to integrate forward); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21 
(1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). 
155. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 352-53. 
156. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive 
Exclusion, 56 ANrrrn.usT LJ. 71, 79 (1987); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 
251 ("[A] firm need not enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to 
price above preexclusionary-rights competitive levels."); see also ThomilS G. Krat-
tenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. LJ. 
241, 249 (1987). 
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puts from it and not from independent sellers, a franchisor could elimi-
nate a certain quantity of demand from the market for those inputs, de-
priving at least some of those independent sellers of the minimum scale 
necessary to operate in the market and thus "create" a more concen-
trated market for the inputs in question.157 Such concentration, of 
course, could facilitate collusion among the input's remaining produc-
ers, raising the costs faced by the franchisor's rivals, and thus allow the 
franchisor to raise its prices above its own costs.158 Assume for a mo-
ment that conditions are ripe for such a strategy: there exist a concen-
trated market for the input(s) in question, barriers to entry into those 
markets, an arrangement that forecloses a substantial share of those 
markets, and inputs that are a significant portion of the cost of the 
franchise product. In these circumstances a franchisor without market 
power could "purchase" from its franchisees commitments not to deal 
with independent sellers of the tied product, perhaps by providing a dis-
count on the price of the franchise.159 Indeed, to the extent that franchis-
ees are able to share in any market power created by such contracts, by, 
for instance, raising their own prices, no such purchase would be neces-
sary. Instead, franchisees eagerly would agree to such an arrangement, 
and the two parties would allocate between themselves the resulting 
supracompetitive profits.160 
There is, of course, no logical connection between proof of a 
prima facie case under Jefferson Parish, and the likelihood that a tying 
contract implements a "raising rivals' costs" strategy. As already noted, 
the pre-existence of market power, a necessary condition for liability 
under the Jefferson Parish framework, is not relevant to proof that a 
contract raises rivals' costs.161 And, even if the four Jefferson Parish 
factors are present, no "raising rivals costs" strategy can succeed unless 
several additional conditions outlined above - substantial foreclosure 
of the market for the inputs in question, barriers to entry into those mar-
kets, and inputs that account for a substantial portion of the cost of the 
ultimate franchise product - are also present. Thus, a plaintiff seeking 
to establish a prima facie case under such a theory would bear a much 
heavier burden than plaintiffs under the Jefferson Parish framework; 
157. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 240-42; see also Steven C. 
Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 .ANrrrn.usT BULL. 551, 563-65 (1986) (describing 
the role of a minimum viable scale as a barrier to entry). 
158. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 240-42. 
159. See generally id. at 223-30. 
160. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 1376-
77 (1991) (demonstrating that vertically related firms can cooperate to create and share 
the resulting supracompetitive profits). 
161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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heavier, even, than advocates of a rule of reason approach to all tying 
contracts usually support.162 Finally, private plaintiffs would have to es-
tablish that they suffered antitrust injury - a difficult task, perhaps, for 
franchisees who signed such an agreement hoping to share in the mo-
nopoly profits created by it - and then seek damages for supra-
competitive profits lost as a result of termination of a franchise.163 
Given all the hurdles a plaintiff would have to overcome to make 
out a prima facie case, it seems doubtful that such litigation would ever 
reach the stage at which procompetitive benefits would be deemed rele-
vant.164 If it did, however, proof of such benefits would not negate the 
possibility that the contract produced substantial anticompetitive effects. 
In fact, where franchisees cooperate in a cost-raising strategy, the pres-
ence of procompetitive benefits simply provides additional inducement 
for the parties to enter into the arrangement. And, even if franchisees 
would otherwise resist such a strategy, the existence of procompetitive 
benefits attenuates the incentive to resist, at least when no less restric-
tive alternative will produce the same or similar benefits. 
Although a complete consideration of the question is beyond the 
scope of this article, it does not appear that, under current law, the pos-
sibility that anticompetitive effects will predominate justifies allowing a 
tribunal to condemn such an arrangement because an anticompetitive 
tying contract designed to raise rivals' costs is in some sense analogous 
to unilateral exclusionary conduct by a monopolist.165 Allegedly exclu-
sionary practices that do not involve cooperation among competitors 
usually are deemed anticompetitive only if they exclude rivals from the 
market on a basis other than superior efficiency, 166 or are explicable 
only on the hypothesis that they will lead to the acquisition of market 
162. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38-39 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (proposing a rule of reason framework for the evaluation of 
tying contracts). 
163. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 38-
39 (1984) (arguing that distributors who profit from resale price maintenance schemes 
should not recover profits lost as a result of termination); see also ELZINGA & BREIT, 
supra note 140, at 88-90 (describing the law regarding in pari delicto). But see Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968) (refusing 
to recognize the in pari delicto defense to distributor suit), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
164. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 267 ("Certainly, in most indus-
tries, exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably employed for anticompetitive 
ends."). 
165. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 
1985) ("Tying is not cooperation among competitors, the focus of§ 1, it is aggressive 
conduct akin to monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act"). 
166. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
(1985); Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-190 (2d Cir. 
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power.167 A franchise tying contract that would be negotiated by the 
parties regardless of the presence of market power or the possibility of 
its acquisition cannot be condemned under this standard, with the result 
that the presumption advocated here should arise even in those in-
stances when the relevant markets appear ripe for a successful anticom-
petitive strategy. Any other approach would likely deter procompetitive 
contracts and, indeed, prevent certain frrms from adopting practices 
that, by hypothesis, also will be adopted by their competitors.168 
Of course, if a frrm that otherwise appears to have adopted a cost-
raising strategy has adopted restraints more restrictive than those actu-
ally employed by its competitors, a court should conclude that the re-
straints are only explicable on the hypothesis that the franchisor is at-
tempting to obtain market power. This is not to say, however, that the 
mere ability to hypothesize a less restrictive alternative should render 
such a contract illegal. Antitrust policy does not prevent admitted mo-
nopolists from adopting otherwise legitimate practices simply because 
those practices may solidify the monopolist's position.169 Similarly, 
franchise contracts that would be adopted absent any expectation of 
market power ought not to be deemed unreasonable.170 
1992) (Marshall, J.) (holding that a practice which is supported by a legitimate business 
justification cannot be deemed exclusionary). 
167. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Pre-
dation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE LJ. 8 (1981). 
168. See Telex Corp. v. Industrial Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928 (lOth 
Cir. 1975) (holding that a practice adopted throughout the industry could not be deemed 
monopolistic); Krattenmak:er & Salop, supra note 66, at 222 (arguing that contracts that 
resulted from "competition on the merits" should not have been deemed anticompeti-
tive even if they foreclosed rivals from the market). 
169. Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) (" '[I]t is 
in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competi-
tion ... .' ") (quoting ArthurS. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 
1057 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
170. The careful reader will wonder why a franchisee would agree to a provision 
that, while procompetitive in the short run, would ultimately drive up the price of the 
franchise, if a raising rivals' costs strategy were successful. '1\vo reasons come to mind. 
First, even if franchisees would collectively prefer something other than a tying require-
ment, free riding among widely dispersed franchisees may well prevent individual fran-
chisees from expressing these actual preferences. See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 531-36; 
Krattenmak:er & Salop, supra note 66, at 268-70 (arguing that because competition is a 
public good, free rider problems will prevent parties from investing sufficiently in its 
preservation). Second, and perhaps most important, franchisees may assist a franchisor 
in obtaining market power and thus share in its fruits. See Hovenkamp, supra note 160, 
at 1380-81. Indeed, a raising rivals' costs strategy in this context involves raising the 
costs of rival franchisees, the ultimate purchasers of the inputs in question. Thus, 
"higher costs for the franchisor's rivals" actually translates into higher prices charged 
by the franchisees' rivals and thus higher prices, revenues and profits for the franchisees 
of the franchisor that has "imposed" the tying requirements contract. The franchisor, of 
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B. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
'lYing contracts are not the only method of controlling free riding. 
One can imagine various alternative methods of policing a franchisee's 
investments in quality, such as input specifications or the designation of 
suppliers other than the franchisor that purportedly maintain a sufficient 
level of quality.171 Thus, one might concede that tying requirements 
could be imposed through a perfectly competitive contracting process 
while also relying on the presence of alternatives to assert that, in fact, 
such tying requirements are anticompetitive.172 After all, why would a 
franchisee agree to such a tying requirement when alternatives are 
available that present less danger that a franchisee might ultimately be 
subject to a less competitive market for the tied product?173 Under this 
reasoning, the procompetitive benefits that result from the tie are in 
some sense coincidental in that a franchisor has forced the franchisee to 
accede to a method of achieving those benefits that is unnecessarily re-
strictive of competition.174 This, of course, is the approach taken by cur-
rent law: the presence of a less restrictive means of achieving the 
procompetitive objectives of a presumptively illegal restraint ipso facto 
requires its condemnation.175 
There is less to this argument than meets the eye. To begin with, 
the adoption of tying provisions in markets that are not susceptible to 
course, will share in these anticompetitive profits as it realizes higher income from 
franchise fees. 
171. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 
F.2d 1033, 1039-42 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding a tie-in unlawful when a "less restrictive 
alternative" of specification is available); cf. Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. 
Supp. 884, 904-905 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding that "forcing" is not present when a 
franchisee has the option to purchase specified "tied products" elsewhere); Paul E. 
Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1232-35 (W.D. Tenn. 
1995) (same). 
172. See Turner, supra note 103, at 62. It should be noted that Turner, an early 
champion of the less restrictive alternative approach is also a father of the "inhospita-
bly" tradition of antitrust. See Wn.LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, 
at 19. 
173. See Bowman, supra note 78, at 19-20 (arguing that an attempt to impose a tie 
would fail in a perfectly competitive market). But see supra note 170 (explaining that 
franchisees may desire to share in any monopoly profits created by such a scheme). 
174. See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 540-52 (noting that ties may be adopted for 
mixed motives). Of course, proponents of such an objection would recognize that even 
when a defendant possesses market power, the adoption of such a restrictive practice is 
only possible given a different sort of free riding problem among franchisees and others 
who purchase the input in question. Absent such a free rider effect, franchisees would 
collectively resist the imposition of the tie. Thus, these proponents would continue, the 
fact that franchisees accede to such a restrictive method of controlling free riding tells 
us nothing about its efficiency. See generally id. at 531-36. 
175. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42. 
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anticompetitive strategies strongly suggests that less restrictive alterna-
tives can be a suboptimal solution to the free riding problem.176 While 
efficacious in the abstract, alternatives such as product specifications 
are more costly to enforce than a tying requirement.177 In addition to 
writing and publishing such specifications, finns must also monitor 
compliance.178 Such monitoring is likely to be especially costly given 
the incentives of franchisees to cheat and cover up their non-
compliance.179 Indeed, to the extent that an outright tie reduces the cost 
of monitoring franchisee behavior, franchisors need to induce less 
franchise-specific investment to deter cheating. Jso 
Less restrictive alternatives are also likely to be less effective. No 
franchisor can regularly inspect more than a fraction of its locations, 
and such inspections are imperfect methods of detennining input qual-
176. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 673-74 (7th Cir. 
1985) (stating that the absence of market power suggests that the practice cannot be an-
ticompetitive); Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928 
(lOth Cir. 1975) (holding that a practice employed by firms without market power can-
not be monopolistic). The federal reports are replete with instances in which purported 
ties were imposed by firms with no power in any relevant product market, let alone 
power in a market for franchises. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, 
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1988) (addressing a situation in which Subaru had a 
.25% market share of the American automobile market, and the plaintiff, whose station-
ary read "Grappone Pontiac," had made no Subaru-speciflc investments); Will, 776 
F.2d at 670-75 (franchisor obtained tie despite lack of market power); Yentsch v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1980) (presenting a situation in which the plaintiff 
signed a dealer agreement with full knowledge of the tie, and there was no showing that 
Texaco possessed market power); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (holding that a 30% market share does not create market power). 
While it is theoretically possible that such contracts could have been designed to 
obtain market power via a raising rivals' costs strategy, see supra text accompanying 
notes 156-70, there is no indication that any of the cases in question involved contracts 
or market structures that were conducive to such a strategy. See Krattenmaker & Salop, 
supra note 66, at 250-51 (listing various factors which are necessary for a cost-raising 
strategy). 
177. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at 'J[ 1716d4; Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 
353-54; Richard S. Markovits, 1ie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, And Policy 
Analysis, 58 TExAs L. REv. 1363, 1382 (1980); Dugan, supra note 27, at 150. 
178. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54; Markovits, supra note 177, at 
1382; Dugan, supra note 27, at 150. 
179. See Dugan, supra note 27, at 151 (claiming that the incentive for dealers to 
cheat renders policing more costly). Given these incentives, it would seem that only 
surprise inspections would suffice. Under a tying contract, by contrast, the franchisor 
only needs to monitor the ratio of sales, e.g., franchise fees, to input purchases. See Roy 
B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1994) (describ-
ing how franchisor monitored the purchase of the tied product). Monitoring purchases 
from other suppliers cannot serve as a substitute. Those suppliers themselves will be 
subject to a free rider problem. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54. 
180. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 352-53. 
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ity. Such considerations no doubt explain findings by juries that no less 
restrictive alternative would adequately protect the interest asserted.181 
The presence of less restrictive alternatives, then, says little, if any-
thing, about whether the challenged contract is the result of "forc-
ing."182 Regardless whether the franchisor possesses market power or 
hopes to obtain it, parties will, other things being equal, adopt a tying 
requirement whenever such a clause is less costly to implement -
which is to say, always- even when the alternative is equally effec-
tive.183 Thus, the fact that parties have chosen such a tying requirement 
is as consistent with a procompetitive objective - minimizing joint 
costs - as with an anticompetitive one - "forcing" or attempting to 
raise the costs of rivals.184 This analysis suggests that, whatever the effi-
cacy of a less restrictive alternative analysis in other contexts, the law 
should not, as it does now, treat the presence of a less restrictive alter-
native as conclusive evidence that the contract is anticompetitive.185 
181. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 
1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987). 
182. Professor Kaplow suggests that, even when a tie is more effective than its al-
ternatives, the presence of a less restrictive alternative still should be dispositive be-
cause the cost savings of choosing a tie are often "minuscule." He also claims that the 
realization that a less restrictive alternative is more costly is of uncertain significance. 
See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 543. As shown in the text, however, this realization is 
quite significant, suggesting, as it does, an alternate explanation - cost-minimization 
- for the employment of a tying requirement instead of a less restrictive arrangement. 
Given this alternate explanation, the adoption by current law of a conclusive presump-
tion that a tie is the result of "forcing" based solely upon (1) satisfaction of the Jeffer-
son Parish test, and (2) the presence of a less restrictive alternative, appears unreasona-
ble. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual mar-
ket realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). This is so even when a tie is 
only marginally more effective than its alternatives: even firms with market power will 
seek to minimize costs, and, in the quest to do so, every little bit helps. 
183. This is a necessary implication of the Cease Theorem. See Cease, supra note 
91. Of course, in those cases in which a predatory counterstrategy is otherwise rational, 
franchisees may choose to bear the higher costs associated with the less restrictive alter-
native, so long as those costs are lower than the expected harm flowing from successful 
predation, discounted by the probability of such success. However, this fact does not 
change the analysis in the text, which is in no way dependent on the ability of franchis-
ees to engage in such a strategy. 
184. Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 
(1986) (holding that summary judgment is mandated when the evidence is equally con-
sistent with procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984) (same). 
185. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (holding that antitrust presumptions 
should rest on actual market realities). Even if the proffered alternative is as effective 
and no more costly to implement than an outright tying requirement, it does not follow 
that failure to adopt it establishes that the tying requirement is the result of forcing or 
an attempt to obtain market power. As both options implement the legitimate objective 
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C. Lock-ins 
The tentative conclusion just reached assumes that a franchisor 
with market power can exercise that power simply by enhancing price. 
Given this option, any use of such power to impose a tying requirement 
to which parties would otherwise agree squanders monopoly profits that 
the franchisor could have earned, quite legally, by raising its price.186 
But what of power obtained after the franchise has been sold? Under 
current law, such power can arise once the cost to the franchisee of 
switching to a different franchise is significant, for instance, if the fran-
chisee has made significant investments specific to the relationship that 
cannot be recovered by selling the franchise. 187 In such cases, the 
franchisor possesses significant power over the franchisee, power that 
by its nature cannot be exercised by raising the franchise sale price.188 
It seems perfectly natural for a franchisor to exercise such power 
by imposing a tying arrangement.189 By threatening to terminate the re-
lationship and requiring the franchisee to purchase inputs at a 
supracompetitive price as a condition of retaining the franchise, the 
franchisor can exploit its newly found "monopoly power."190 In these 
equally well, the failure to adopt the less restrictive means is as consistent with a ran• 
dom selection of one over the other as it is with an attempt to exercise or obtain market 
power. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29. 
187. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476-77; 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 73, at 'li 1709.2c (1995 Supp.). Kodak also suggests that such a lock-in can occur 
when the tying requirement is present from the beginning, but not recognized by the 
purchaser. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-76; see also Craswell, supra note 139, at 672-73 
(arguing that buyers might not recognize ties at the outset, even if ties are contained in 
a standard contract). This article assumes that such a strategy would not be possible in 
the franchise context in light of the sophistication of potential franchisees as well as the 
existence of state and federal laws mandating disclosure of such tying requirements in 
writing. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19; see also William F. Baxter & 
Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 
47 STAN. L. REv. 615, 618 n.23 (1995); Craswell, supra note 139, at 697-98 (arguing 
that the failure to disclose tying requirements terms is best addressed by consumer pro-
tection laws); Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market 
Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REv. 185, 251 (1994) (describing federal dis-
closure rules). 
188. Cj. Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining how 
the presence of relationship-specific investments can leave a franchisee at the mercy of 
a franchisor that can terminate the relationship at will). 
189. See Lande, supra note 73, at 200 & n.24. 
190. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at 'li 1712e. (addressing the ability of a tie to 
evade private price ceiling). Of course, the franchisor need not in all circumstances 
threaten to terminate the franchise outright to exploit this power. It can instead reduce 
the allocation of products to the distributor or take other action that threatens the value 
of the franchise. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1282, 
1286-87 & n.16 (D.N.H. 1982) (addressing a situation in which the franchisor never 
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circumstances, it seems, the mere presence of procompetitive benefits 
does not itself suggest that the tie is the result of voluntary contractual 
integration. Instead, whatever iJ:Icentives exist to create such an arrange-
ment coexist with an incentive to use it to reap monopoly profits that 
are otherwise unobtainiible, such that a rational franchisor might attempt 
to eliminate free riding and charge a supracompetitive price for the tied 
product.191 
In response, it should be noted that any such argument assumes 
that the franchisee has failed to protect itself ex ante from those actions 
- threats of termination, hold up of products, and the like - that con-
stitute "market power" wider the regime established by Kodak. 192 The 
argument also assumes that the threat of reputational losses and lost 
franchise sales does not deter the franchisor from embarking on such a 
strategy,193 that "downstream competition" from competing franchise 
systems does not render such a strategy unprofitable, 194 and that the 
defendant has attempted to "impose" the purported tie at some point 
after the franchisee has made investments specific to the franchise rela-
tionship.195 Yet, under the regime of Kodak, these arguments merely 
threatened to tenninate the franchisee, but reduced the franchisee's allocation of vehi-
cles}, revd., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988). 
191. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 87-88. Such an upcharge does not, in and 
of itself, pose any danger of creating power in the market for the tied product Yet, 
under the rationale of Kodak, no such danger is necessary. See AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <Jl 1709.1a (1995 Supp.); Kaplow, supra note 78, at 
520-25 (arguing that antitrust policy should condemn the exploitation of monopoly 
power via leverage, even when there is no threat of competitive harm in the market for 
the tied product). 
192. See Lande, supra note 73, at 200 ("Absent imperfect information this rent 
extraction would not be a concern, for no franchisee would sign a franchise arrange-
ment that would enable the franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill.''). In this vein, 
one scholar argues that the very absence of contractual protection against such opportu-
nism suggests that purchasers have determined that such protection is unnecessary, with 
the result that no "lock-in" is present. See Klein, supra note 72, at 50-52. 
193. See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on 
the Kodak Case, 62 ANTrrR.UST LJ. 177, 188-89 (1993). 
194. See id. at 187; 9 AREEoA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <JI 1709c2. 
Thus, if the downstream market is highly competitive and the strategy increases the 
price of a significant input, consumers will substitute away from the franchise's prod-
ucts, reducing any franchise fees earned by the franchisor and rendering the scheme un-
profitable. See International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 104 FI'C 280, 410-11 (1984) 
(including "downstream competition" in the relevant market); AREEDA & 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <JI 520lb1 (1996 Supp.); HoRIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 1.11(3); cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (including within the relevant market both virgin 
ingot and ingot fabricated for sale downstream). 
195. See Lee v. Life Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding no 
lock-in where plaintiffs knew of the challenged policy before making asset-specific in-
vestments); Kenosha Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 895 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1990) 
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raise questions of fact to be addressed by the tribunal in determining 
whether the franchisor possesses power over the tying product as a re-
sult of a lock-in.196 Thus, any attempt to "filter" good ties from bad ties 
by focusing solely on procompetitive effects appears inconsistent with 
the current legal landscape, which requires courts in some cases to as-
sume that these effects coexist with the exercise of market power and to 
engage in the required balancing analysis. 
Closer scrutiny, however, suggests the existence of another condi-
tion that is necessary to evade the prima facie legality standard pro-
posed here. To this point, we have assumed that a franchisor's exercise 
of market power can only take the form of reducing the output of 
franchises, with the result that there can be no exercise of market power 
- aside from tying - once those awards have been made. Yet, even 
after franchises are awarded, there exists a separate outlet for a firm's 
market power: namely, an increase in the price of products sold to the 
franchisee. Thus, if an automobile dealer has made investments specific 
to the dealership that lock the dealer into the relationship, the manufac-
turer may exercise its power simply by increasing the price of automo-
biles sold to the dealer.197 When this option is present, the incentive to 
employ a tie for the purpose of exercising market power becomes more 
ambiguous, and we are drawn back to the general conclusion offered 
here - that any use of market power to impose such a tie would be an 
irrational waste of that power such that. the presence of procompetitive 
benefits suggests that the arrangement is prima facie legal.19s 
Yet, even if a tie is the only method through which a franchisor 
could exercise market power conferred by a lock-in, the existence of 
procompetitive benefits still should render a tie prima facie lawful. Here 
it is important to distinguish between two possible sources of anticom-
petitive harm: the tying requirement itself, which forecloses the fran-
chisee from purchasing the tied product elsewhere, and any upcharge on 
the tied product. Where a franchisor in such a position could obtain 
(fmding that the manufacturer need not terminate a distributor to exploit the value of 
the former's brand when it can raise the price of the primacy product). Of course, when 
a franchisor can terminate a franchise at will, it can effectively raise franchise fees at 
any time. 
196. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 471-
79 (1992). But cf. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 
762 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that Kodak assumed, rather than decided, this question). 
197. See Hay, supra note 193, at 185-87 (describing a hypothetical scheme 
whereby a fast food franchisee exploits locked-in franchisees by charging monopoly 
meat prices). 
198. Cf. Kenosha Liquor, 895 F.2d at 420 (granting summary judgment for the 
manufacturer when the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer had acted irrationally by 
exploiting the allure of the brand name via termination). 
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such an agreement through voluntary negotiation, it would not use any 
market power to impose the tie itself but instead only to enhance the 
price of the tied product. Thus, the existence of procompetitive benefits 
suggests that the tying requirement itself is not the result of forcing. 
Even when a lock-in confers market power, then, the presence of 
procompetitive effects should render the tying requirement prima facie 
legal, subject, of course, to the plaintiff's ability to prove an actual 
upcharge.199 
D. Price Discrimination 
The analysis offered here assumes that_franchisors that wish to ex-
ercise whatever market power they possess can do so simply by raising 
the price of the franchise.200 This assumption may not always describe 
entirely a franchisor's options, however. When different franchisees 
value the franchise opportunity differently, merely raising the price 
across the board will not capture the full profit available to a franchisor 
with market power.201 In these circumstances, a franchisor can only real-
ize the full potential of its power by discriminating in price among vari-
ous purchasers.202 
This realization is not itself an objection to the analysis offered 
here. A franchisor with information about the demand elasticities of po-
tential franchisees simply could vary the prices charged to different 
franchisees accordingly.203 Thus the realization simply suggests that the 
approach offered here depends on the assumption that franchisors pos-
sess sufficient information about various franchisees to engage in price 
discrimination. Absent such information, the assumption that a 
franchisor necessarily would prefer to exercise whatever market power 
it possesses by increasing price collapses. Such a collapse leaves one to 
suspect that, at least in some circumstances, tying requirements that 
produce procompetitive benefits are in fact utilized by franchisors as 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34. Such an increase could take the 
form of higher up-front prices, franchise fees, or both. 
201. See HoVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 342 ("Even the monopolist charging its 
nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price does not make all the money theoretically 
possible from its position."). 
202. See id. at 341-42; see also M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 
Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960). 
203. See JEAN TlROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142-43 
(1988). 
156 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:111 
devices for price discrimination.204 This conclusion, in tum, suggests a 
return to a sort of balancing test whereby the burdens of price discrimi-
nation are balanced against the benefits of eliminating free riding.zos 
Ultimately, however, the realization that imperfect infonnation 
may lead a franchisor in some instances to utilize tying contracts to 
price discriminate does not require an approach different from that of-
fered here.206 Such a strategy is only possible when purchases of the 
tied product are a strong indicator of a franchisee's elasticity of demand 
for the franchise opportunity, an elasticity that many assume is highly 
correlated with a franchisee's sale of the franchise product generally.207 
Many franchise tying cases, however, involve instances in which the 
franchisee's purchases of the tied product are poorly correlated with its 
total revenues.208 Moreover, even when purchases of the tied product 
correspond with total sales, there is little guarantee that sales are a 
strong proxy for elasticity. Instead, such elasticity will more likely de-
pend upon the competition to be faced by the franchisee in its territory, 
as well as the availability of substitute franchise opportunities.209 
204. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33 (discussing the conditions 
under which franchisors may use tying arrangements as vehicles for price 
discrimination). 
205. See Wn.LIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 373 n.14 
(describing such an analysis). 
206. Of course, the most potent response to such an objection may be to argue that 
price discrimination is itself of no concern of the Sherman Act absent some independent 
showing of anticompetitive effect. See Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 13 (1994) (prohibiting price discrimination that lessens competition). 
207. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33; Burstein, supra note 202, at 
72. 
208. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 793-
96 (1st Cir. 1988) (addressing a tying requirement that the franchisee maintain an ade-
quate supply of replacement parts); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 
F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing a tying requirement that the dealer util-
ize Mercedes or Mercedes-approved replacement parts); Southern Pines Chrysler-Plym-
outh v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1987) (addressing a tying re-
quirement that the franchisee purchase automobiles that sold poorly); Paul E. Volpp 
Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-14 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) 
(addressing a tying requirement that the franchisee purchase replacement parts only 
from the franchisor). Also, when the franchise is of the "source" variety - when the 
franchisee purchases the franchise product from the franchisor - sales of the tied prod-
uct are often directly proportional to sales of that main product, such that sales of the 
tied product are no better as a proxy for elasticity than sales of the main product itself. 
See, e.g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 
472-73 (3rd Cir. 1992) (addressing a tying requirement that Chrysler's franchisees 
purchase sound systems from it). 
209. Professor Hovenkamp, who views franchise tying contracts as presumptive 
vehicles for price discrimination, see HoVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33, notes in 
a different context that "[t]here are no two identical firms in two different cities. Even 
two McDonald's franchises in identical buildings and traffic areas, and with equally ca-
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At any rate, franchisors overcome such informational barriers by 
methods of price discrimination other than tying contracts. Imposition 
of a franchise fee, for instance, would seem to be an excellent vehicle 
for price discrimination; those franchisees with large revenues will ulti-
mately pay more for the franchise than those who do poorly.210 The 
availability of a less cumbersome method of price discrimination sug-
gests that (1) tying requirements often accomplish something different 
- that is to say, beneficial- from price discrimination, and (2) the 
elimination of price discrimination by prohibiting franchise tying con-
tracts is largely a quixotic endeavor, the pursuit of which does not jus-
tify a departure from the general approach offered here. Indeed, when 
tying is the best method of price discrimination, prohibiting it will sim-
ply lead firms to adopt less· effective measures, measures that may well 
lead to even lower output and larger allocative losses, as franchisors in-
cur additional transaction costs in their quest to determine the demand 
elasticities of various franchisees.211 Antitrust policy would not be well 
served by such a result.212 Requiring franchisees actually to prove price 
discrimination by showing an unjustified upcharge on the tied product 
will vindicate whatever consumer interest is served by prohibiting tying 
as a means of price discrimination. · 
pable management, can show widely different rates of profitability." Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 39 (1989). Both pro-
positions, it seems, cannot be correct. 
210. See Burstein, supra note 202, at 73-74 (arguing that a franchise fee is an "an-
cillary condition" that facilitates price discrimination); Kaplow, supra note 78, at 540-
42 (claiming that the presence of alternative methods of price discrimination suggests 
that a tie is not a vehicle for such discrimination); Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 
28, at 438 ("rrlhere are fairly costless mechanisms that McDonald's could use to ex-
tract more rents from higher volume or promising restaurants."). Indeed, to the extent 
that a franchisee's revenues are a better proxy for its demand elasticity than are its 
purchases of the tied product, such a method of discrimination will be superior to a ty-
ing arrangement. Cf. Burstein, supra note 202, at 72 (arguing that the success of a tying 
scheme as a vehicle for price discrimination depends upon "the assumption that sales of 
the [tied product] will be highly correlated with sales of the [tying product] over time"). 
211. See OUVER E. Wn.UAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTrrn.usT IMPUCATIONS 11-13 (1975) (noting that monopolists are willing to 
incur transaction costs to realize . the benefits of price discrimination); see also Basil 
Yamey, Monopolistic Price Discrimination and Economic Welfare, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 
377 (1974). 
212. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.3 (1988) (refusing to 
adopt a per se rule because such a rule will lead parties to engage in inefficient prac-
tices as a means of evasion); see also Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 56 n.25 (1977) (rejecting a rule that will simply lead firms to accomplish an-
ticompetitive objectives in other, more costly, ways). 
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E. Recalcitrant Franchisees 
Of course, few franchisees challenge tying requirements at their in-
ception - it is difficult to locate cases in which franchisees seek de-
claratory judgments that the contracts they are about to enter are illegal. 
Instead, most such challenges surface later, either in the midst of there-
lationship or in response to termination of the franchise.213 One might 
ask: if franchise tying contracts are so beneficial to franchisees, why are 
they so often subject to challenge? Does not the presence of so many 
lawsuits challenging restrictions support the theory, outlined in Stan-
dard Oil, that such contracts are "forced" on franchisees? 
This objection appears ill-founded in light of the economic charac-
teristics of the franchise relationship, characteristics that suggest that 
such suits are often a symptom of free riding. By creating a strong rep-
utation for quality associated with the franchise trademark, the enforce-
ment of a tying requirement makes free riding all the more remunera-
tive.214 It should be no surprise then that some franchisees will attempt 
to "have their cake and eat it too" - pay a lower price for the 
franchise opportunity and free ride on other franchisees.215 Of course, 
contractual remedies for such shirking are likely to be ineffective,216 
with the result that franchisors can only resort to self-help, namely, the 
termination of a franchise or the threat to do so, to obtain compliance 
with the tying requirement.217 Termination may deprive the franchisee 
213. See Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th 
' Cir. 1994) (addressing a claim filed after the tennination of the franchise challenging 
certain tying tenns contained in the initial agreement); cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 
(1995); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Siegel v. 
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1971) (evaluating tying require-
ments in place for nearly two decades before the suit). But cf. Little Caesar Enters. v. 
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (addressing a tying requirement al-
legedly imposed after the award of the franchise); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New En-
gland, Inc., 534 F. Supp. at 1286-87 (D.N.H. 1982) (same), revd., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
214. See Easterbrook, supra note 163, at 38-39 (discussing incentives for dealers 
to cheat on resale price maintenance schemes); Muris, supra note 34, at 575-80; supra 
text accompanying notes 29-44 (discussing franchisees' general incentives to shirk). 
215. See Wn..LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 371 (observ-
ing that the desire to "have your cake (low price) and eat it too (no restrictions)" is in-
consistent with "the theory and the practice of contract"); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 99-100 (noting that franchisees pay a lower price for franchise opportunity 
by promising not to free ride). 
216. See Muris, supra note 34, at 575. 
217. See Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28 (concluding that McDonald's 
leaves rents downstream for franchisees to create a "penalty" for tennination); Klein, 
supra note 95, at 358-59 (claiming that the threat of tennination of franchisees and the 
resulting loss of specific investment constitute a "perfonnance bond" paid by the fran-
chisee to assure quality); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic 
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of franchise-specific investments or economic rents, thereby motivating 
a lawsuit seeking lucrative treble damages.218 
As a theoretical matter, such damages should be nonexistent in 
those cases where the challenged arrangement is efficient - where 
there is no upcharge on the tied product.219 Yet, to the extent that courts 
award damages - as they often do - reflecting the lost value of the 
franchise opportunity itself, no such upcharge must be proven.220 Even 
when no such franchise-specific investments are present, a franchisee 
still may bring suit, insofar as the remedy for termination is not limited 
to the economic rents lost as a result of termination, but in some cir-
cumstances may include injunctive relief as well.221 The threat to seek 
such an injunction - to impose significant externalities on the 
franchise system - may allow a plaintiff to obtain a lucrative settle-
ment. Thus, current law against tying, combined with the possibility of 
treble damages, provides a mechanism whereby franchisees can obtain a 
franchise for a lower price by promising not to free ride, all the while 
planning to do so, knowing full well that, if caught, they will have the 
"insurance policy" of a treble damage action.222 The presence of so 
many suits simply suggests that franchisees are acting opportunistically, 
Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 125, 129 
(1982) (same). 
218. See Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 757 
(2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the propensity of terminated distributors to file treble damage 
actions). 
219. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1971); see 
also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (limiting treble 
damage remedies to those injuries that flow from anticompetitive conduct). 
220. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 59 n.19 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing a 
method of calculating damages based on termination); Hovenkamp, supra note 209, at 
5; see also supra text accompanying notes 148-49; cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 
F.2d 520, 556-560 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that normal profits were not available given 
the duty to mitigate damages). 
221. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 
1970) (Friendly, J.) (observing that equitable relief is available when the plaintiff had a 
contractual expectation to remain a distributor). 
222. See ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 140, at 84-90. Indeed, some scholars 
have gone so far as to suggest that the existence of treble damages provides dealers 
with the incentive to breach their contracts purposely in the hope of being terminated. 
See WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. El.ZINGA, ANrrrR.usT PENALTY REFORM 36-
38 (1986); Henry N. Butler, Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic 
Pursuit of Treble Damages, 59 WASH. L. REv. 27 (1983). But cf. Robert H. Lande, Are 
Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 115 (1993) (ar-
guing that treble damages do not overcompensate plaintiffs). Similarly, one could argue 
that present tying law presents distributors with the lucrative option of benefiting from a 
tying arrangement for several years only to challenge it thereafter, reaping treble dam-
ages or an injunction. 
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and tells us nothing about the efficacy or origin of franchise tying 
contracts. 
F. Bypassing the Coercion Element? 
At bottom, this article concludes that ties that produce substantial 
procompetitive benefits which are internalized by the parties are most 
probably not forced on franchises through the exercise of market power, 
but instead are examples of voluntary contractual integration about 
which the antitrust laws should not be concerned. This suggestion that 
"voluntariness"- however determined- ought to save an otherwise 
per se illegal tie may ring hollow to the practitioner familiar with the 
formal elements of tying analysis, specifically, the tying requirement 
that "conditioning," which generally includes "coercion" or "forcing," 
be present.223 Does the present proposal add to the coercion analysis al-
ready required, or is it a call for a second bite at the coercion apple? 
The proposal offered here would constitute a second bite if, in fact, 
the current law governing the conditioning element and the subsidiary 
inquiry into coercion reflected a rational method of sorting "coercive" 
ties from those that are "voluntary" in the sense employed here. Pres-
ent law generally makes no such attempt. A few courts do not even re-
quire a showing of coercion.224 Moreover, in some other courts, a fmd-
ing of coercion can be based simply on a showing that a form contract 
contained the tying requirement, and that there was no chance for nego-
tiation over the provision.225 As one court recently held in the franchise 
context 
Where the tying arrangement is admitted or . , . imposed as part of a 
contract, there is no further need to demonstrate the forcing element. Be-
cause of the very nature of a binding contract, coercion and forcing can 
be implied since the victim of the tying arrangement has no other choice 
223. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-18 (1984) (de-
fining a per se violation with reference to the possibility of "forcing"); Paul E. Volpp 
Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1231-32 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); 
Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 895 (B.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that 
"forcing" is a necessary element of a franchise tying claim). 
224. See Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1130-32 (6th Cir. 1981); 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977). 
225. See, e.g., Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions, Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1416-17 
(lith Cir. 1987), modified by Thomson v. Metropolitan Multi List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566 
(11th Cir. 1991); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1506, 
1517 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). Contra Capital Tempora-
ries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 666 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the mere fact 
that a franchisee signed a standard franchise contract does not establish coercion). 
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but to comply with the arrangement or face litigation to enforce the 
contract.226 
Indeed, in some courts, a showing that an appreciable number of buyers 
accepted a "burdensome" term establishes by itSelf the element of co-
ercion.227 Finally, at least one court has held that threatening to termi-
nate a dealer for failure to abide by a tying tying requirement in the 
original contract is sufficient to establish coercion.228 
Obviously, the present tests governing "coercion" or "condition-
ing" are not up to the task of distinguishing procompetitive ties from 
those that are anticompetitive on the grounds offered here. The mere 
fact that a provision appears "burdensome" after the contract has been 
entered does not require the conclusion that the provision has been "im-
posed" at all.229 Instead, the franchisee simply may have accepted the 
term in return for a different, favorable term or a lower price.230 Moreo-
ver, courts that deem the mere presence of a condition in a binding con-
tract to be "coercive" confuse the process of contract enforcement-
which necessarily involves public or private coercion - with that of 
contract formation.231 The test offered here avoids this confusion and al-
lows courts to sort agreements that have been "imposed" from those 
that are freely bargained for. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRANCHISE CONTEXT 
The analysis offered here has significant possible application in 
other contexts, where the presence of low transaction costs suggests that 
226. Little Caesar, 895 F. Supp. at 896; see also Volpp Tractor, 917 F. Supp. at 
1232; Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Dist, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 
973, 979-88 (D. Mass. 1979). 
227. See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Hill v. A-T-0 Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976). 
228. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 839-41 (4th Cir. 1960). 
229. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (stating that a court 
may refuse to enforce a contractual term that is unconscionable "at the time the con-
tract is made") (emphasis added). 
230. As Professor Williamson explains: 
It is easy to conclude, upon examining a contract at a point in time, that one of 
the parties to the exchange is disadvantaged by the restraint .••. 
Such a myopic conception fails to recognize that the terms under which the 
original franchise was struck reflect the associated restraints. It is understandably 
attractive to have your cake (low price) and eat it too (no restrictions). But both 
the theory and the practice of contract preclude that. 
Wn.LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITliTIONS, supra note 8, at 371; see also supra text ac-
companying notes 98-100 (explaining that franchisees will not be willing to pay a suffi-
ciently high price for the right to choose inputs). 
231. See, e.g., Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich. 
1995).-
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a partial equilibrium tradeoff analysis is inappropriate. Consider the so-
called ~'false attribution" justification for tying contracts. Here, the 
seller asserts that it must require the purchaser to take from it a comple-
ment of the tying product to ensure that use of a lower quality comple-
ment does not cause the tying product to break down, improperly un-
dermining its reputation.232 Under current law, courts assume that such a 
tying requirement, while possibly beneficial, must be forced on an un-
willing purchaser by means of the exercise of market power.233 The 
analysis offered here, however, suggests that the seller, who internalizes 
the benefits of eliminating the "false attribution" problem, will charge 
a lower price to those customers who accept the tying requirement and 
a higher price to those who do not.234 Such price differentials, of course, 
are cost-justified and thus unrelated to the exercise of market power, 
suggesting that, when a tying requirement does eliminate a "false attri-
bution" problem, no forcing is present, even when a less restrictive al-
ternative is available. 
A recent decision involving a horizontal restraint provides another 
possible application of the analysis offered here. In United States v. 
Brown University,235 MIT argued, inter alia, that an agreement limiting 
competition between it and other elite colleges and universities with re-
spect to fmancial aid awards to non-needy students was necessary to 
improve the quality of education at the respective schools, by diverting 
the increased profits associated with reduced competition to scholar-
ships for students of diverse socio-economic backgrounds.236 The Third 
Circuit held that a rule of reason balancing test was appropriate - that 
the fact fmder should balance the benefits of an improved education 
against the harms resulting from the limitation on competition imposed 
by the challenged agreement.237 Such an approach, of course, consti-
tuted a classic partial equilibrium welfare analysis: the fact fmder was 
required to compare the harm flowing from the exercise of market 
232. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483-
84 (1992). The classic example is ffiM's tying requirement that customers purchase 
from it "punch cards" for use in its tabulating machines, purportedly to insure that use 
of inferior cards did not cause the machines to malfunction. See mM v. United States, 
298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936); see also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 
392, 397-98 (1947); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Penn. 
1960}, affd., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam). 
233. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104. 
235. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
236. See 5 F.3d at 674. 
237. See 5 F.3d at 676-79. 
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power with the benefit associated with the enhanced demand for the 
schools' respective products. 
Here again, the transaction cost approach has powerful implica-
tions. If, in fact, the benefit of enhancing socio-economic diversity at a 
college or university improves the quality of the education, and thus 
outweighs the resulting harm to other students, we would expect that a 
school could, absent transaction costs, unilaterally adopt policies en-
hancing such diversity and, as a result, realize a higher demand for its 
services. More precisely, a school could differentiate its product from 
others and thus command a higher price in the form of less attractive 
scholarship awards to non-needy students. In such circumstances, a 
"less restrictive alternative" - no restraint at all - would be called 
for, insofar as each institution could achieve the very same procompeti-
tive objective without acting collectively. Thus, litigation resources cur-
rently spent balancing one effect against another would be better em-
ployed determining the magnitude of transaction costs attending the 
relationship between schools and prospective students. 
Finally, it should be noted that the approach offered here has im-
plications for the scope of available remedies to redress restraints that 
the law otherwise might deem unreasonable. It is well settled that pri-
vate plaintiffs may obtain legal or equitable relief only upon proof of 
"antitrust injury"- when the alleged injury flows from the aspect of a 
restraint or practice that renders it unlawful and is the type of injury 
that the antitrust laws seek to prevent.238 The analysis advanced here 
suggests that many of the injuries alleged by private plaintiffs - for in-
stance, foreclosure from competing in the market as the result of an ex-
clusive dealing or tying contract239 - might not be related to any exer-
cise of market power, but might instead be the natural result of 
contractual integration that produces procompetitive benefits. Thus, 
even where a contract might be, on balance, anticompetitive, a plaintiff 
would not suffer antitrust injury when the presence of significant 
procompetitive effects suggests that the parties would have entered the 
very same contract absent any prospect of obtaining or exercising mar-
238. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. 479 U.S. 104, 109-13 (1986). 
239. See, e.g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 
F.2d 468, 481-85 (3rd Cir. 1992) (en bane) (addressing the claim that foreclosure re-
sulted from a tying contract); Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 
11-12 (1st Cir. 1987) (addressing the allegation that foreclosure from the market re-
sulted from an exclusive dealing contract). 
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ket power. In these circumstances, challenges to such contracts would 
be left to public agencies, or, perhaps, consumers. 240 
CONCLUSION 
Economists have demonstrated that franchise tying contracts can 
reduce free riding by franchisees and thus increase output. The partial 
equilibrium tradeoff framework that governs the analysis of tying ar-
rangements and trade restraints, however, is premised upon the presence 
of high transaction costs. Under this approach, any beneficial effects of 
a challenged restraint must be weighed against anticompetitive effects 
that are presumed once the plaintiff proves the elements of a per se vio-
lation. Moreover, as in other antitrust contexts, the presence of a less re-
strictive means of achieving the tie's objectives is fatal to the arrange-
ment regardless whether it is on balance procompetitive. 
This article has demonstrated that the balancing framework so 
thoroughly developed and rigorously applied in a variety of antitrust 
contexts is simply ill-suited to the evaluation of tying contracts that re-
duce the agency costs associated with the separation of the ownership 
of a trademark from its control - a separation inherent in the franchise 
system. In particular, once the plaintiff makes a showing of market 
power, the ordinary framework assumes that any procompetitive bene-
fits associated with the reduction in agency costs are "forced" on fran-
chisees and thus necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects. As 
shown here, however, this assumption is ill-founded in the tying con-
text, where transaction costs are very low. Instead, in such cases, parties 
are in a position to order their relationship voluntarily in a manner that 
produces procompetitive benefits internalized by each. The presence of 
such benefits strongly suggests that the defendant need not exercise 
market power to achieve them - that no "forcing" is present. 
Insofar as the exercise of market power involves the sacrifice of 
monopoly profits, the presence of such benefits strongly suggests that 
the franchisor would not "impose" a tying contract through the exer-
cise of market power, but would negotiate for the voluntary inclusion of 
such a provision. Thus, the existence of such benefits requires a conclu-
sion that the arrangement is prima facie unrelated to the exercise of 
market power or any hope of obtaining it, with the result that the ar-
240. Cf. Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 826 F.2d 
1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no antitrust injury when the same hann would have 
occurred in the absence of an anticompetitive effect); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper 
Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977) (observing that antitrust laws are not designed 
to remedy those harms that result from procompetitive practices). 
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rangement should be presumed legal, regardless of whether a less re-
strictive alternative is available. · 
This is not to say that any arrangement that produces procompeti-
tive benefits should be deemed per se legal: the test proposed here 
would still allow a plaintiff to show that a tying contract is unreasona-
ble by proving that there is an unjustified "upcharge" on the tied prod-
uct. However, once the defendant has shown that the challenged con-
tract creates substantial procompetitive benefits, such proof must 
proceed without the benefit of either the presumption that arises upon 
the proof of market power or the "less restrictive alternative" test. 
Finally, the implications of this approach apply beyond the 
franchise tying context to other situations in. which the parties enjoy 
low transaction costs. In these circumstances a partial equilibrium ·trade-
off analysis is simply inappropriate. The test that is normally applied, 
and the standards governing the available remedies for unreasonable re-
straints, must be adjusted accordingly. 
